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ARTICLES
THE LEGALIZATION OF PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE:
CREATING A REGULATORY POTEMKIN VILLAGE
Daniel Callahan*
Margot White**
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, both professional and lay opinion
have shown a markedly favorable shift toward the legalization
of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (PAS).' Yet the
translation of that support into legislation has come more slow-
ly. Only in 1994, after the failure in some states to enact leg-
islation and the defeat of ballot initiatives in California in 1991
and Washington in 1992, did an initiative finally succeed in
Oregon. Although a court injunction has prevented it from tak-
ing effect, the fact of its passage marks an historical milestone.
Among Western countries, euthanasia and PAS are legally
available only in the Netherlands and the Northern Territory of
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Australia. The latter recently passed a "Rights of the Terminal-
ly Ill" bill allowing euthanasia (though it will not immediately
go into effect).2 Elsewhere, the debate remains primarily aca-
demic-with the obvious exception of the twelve states in the
United States where bills were pending in 1995.
Why did the ballot initiative succeed in Oregon after it had
failed in two other states?3 There are two likely reasons. The
first reason is that the Oregon initiative was more carefully
formulated than the initiatives in California and Washington;
in particular it tried to take into account worries about abuse
that were said to have contributed to the defeat of the earlier
initiatives. The second reason is an important change of empha-
sis, from a focus on euthanasia in California and Washington to
one exclusively on physician-assisted suicide in Oregon. The
formulators of the Oregon initiative believed, probably correctly,
that PAS would arouse less apprehension because it made pa-
tients, rather than physicians, the final agents of their own
deaths.
Despite the changed formulation in Oregon and other legal
formulations to be found in various proposed state laws and
relevant literature, it is the contention of this article that it is
impossible in principle and in practice to regulate either eutha-
nasia or PAS successfully. This is not to deny that carefully
crafted laws and regulations might be written, although the
fact that this has not been done in practice suggests that this
goal may be unattainable. Yet, however careful the language,
the nature of the doctor-patient relationship and of the medical
procedures themselves renders them resistant to the standards
asked for by one article: "clear criteria, rigorous procedures, and
adequate safeguards."4 We liken the effort to devise suitable
legal standards to that of erecting Potemkin villages,5 an elabo-
2. Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 1995, 108 BULL. MED. ETHIcS 8-1 (1995).
3. See Peter M. McGough, Washington State Initiative 119: The First Public Vote
on Legalizing Physician-Assisted Death, 2 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTH CARE ETHICS 63-67
(1993) (discussing the failure of the initiative in Washington); Allan Parachini, The
California Humane and Dignified Death Initiative, 19 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.
1989 at 10, 10-12 (addressing the failure of the California legislation).
4. Franklin G. Miller et al., Regulating Physician-Assisted Death, 331 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 119, 120 (1994).
5. The term "Potemkin Village" originally referred to sham villages created in
18th century Russia to impress Empress Catherine II on her tours of the country.
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rate regulatory facade concealing a poverty of potential for
actual enforcement.
In developing this argument, we should make clear at the
outset that we morally oppose euthanasia and PAS. We would
continue that opposition even if adequate legal safeguards could
be developed, which we believe they cannot for the reasons we
discuss in this article. The impossibility of devising effective
safeguards simply adds one more reason to oppose euthanasia
and PAS, but by no means is it the only reason. Since the
legislative emphasis has of late seen a tactical shift from eutha-
nasia to PAS, our analysis will focus primarily on the latter.
We believe, however, that much of what we say would apply
with at least as much force to euthanasia and that the practice
cannot be restricted to PAS. We will begin with an examination
of the logical and practical problems of writing meaningful laws
in this domain, discussing some of the more prominent articles
in the literature proposing model guidelines. We will then take
a brief look at the Dutch experience of regulating euthanasia,
analyze the strategy and language of some proposed statutes
and of the successful Oregon ballot initiative, and conclude with
some general reflections on the problem of developing regulato-
ry safeguards.
II. THE LOGIC OF REGULATION
Although there has been a variety of moral and medical
objections over the years to euthanasia and PAS, among the
most prominent have been worries about the potential for
abuse. Even many of those who might morally accept euthana-
sia and PAS, under some circumstances, have doubted that
their legalization could avoid the danger of coercion or manipu-
lation.6 Nonetheless, it is not difficult for most people to imag-
ine circumstances-or personally to have observed them-where
even the best medical and palliative care appears unable to
relieve pain or suffering, and where death is marked by misery
and despair. Thus, the pull toward legalization of PAS is
6. See THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH
IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT xii, 102,
119-120, 140 (1994) [hereinafter NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE].
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strong, and even those firmly opposed on moral grounds can
partially understand, and even sympathize with, the motiva-
tions of its proponents-however much they conclude (as we do)
that its legalization would be a medical, social, and moral di-
saster.
Proponents of PAS have had to discharge a heavy double
burden. They have had to show, first, that there are good moral
and medical reasons to accept PAS, which they have most com-
monly attempted to do by arguing the rights to self-determina-
tion and to mercy in the relief of suffering. These have been
discussed amply elsewhere and will not be summarized here.'
Second, the proponents have had to show that laws and regula-
tions can be formulated which provide clear criteria and sound
procedures, and most importantly, obviate or radically minimize
the possibility of abuse. Since there appears to be a consider-
able reservoir of public sympathy for PAS, meeting this second
requirement has been of special importance, perhaps the key to
legislative success.
Two arguments have been deployed to take on the worry
about abuse. On the one hand, there is the contention that
careful and effective rules precluding or minimizing abuse can
be written;8 and on the other hand, that the current situation
of widespread violation of the present legal prohibitions and a
secret, unregulated underground practice of PAS is itself a
dangerous legal corruption, crying out for rectification? It is
alleged that many doctors, at considerable professional and
legal risk, are complying with their patients' pleas for relief,
7. See DON V. BAILEY, THE CHALLENGE OF EUTHANASIA: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOG-
RAPHY ON EUTHANASIA AND RELATED TOPICS (1990); Margaret P. Battin, Euthanasia,
in HEALTH CARE ETHICS 58 (Tom Regan & Donald Van Der Veer eds., 1987); HELGA
KUHSE, THE SANCTITY-OF-LIFE DOCTRINE IN MEDICINE (1987); JAMES RACHELS, THE
END OF LIFE: EUTHANASIA & MORALITY (1986); Howard Brody, Assisted Death-A
Compassionate Response to a Medical Failure, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1384, 1384-87
(1992); Franklin G. Miller & Howard Brody, Professional Integrity and Physician-As-
sisted Death, 25 HASTINGS CENTER REP., May 1995 at 8, 8-17; Franklin G. Miller &
John C. Fletcher, The Case for Legalized Euthanasia, 36 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED.
159, 159-76 (1993).
8. Timothy E. Quill et al., Care of the Hopelessly Ill: Proposed Clinical Criteria
for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1380, 1383 (1992); Miller et al.,
supra note 4, at 122; see also Dan Brock, Voluntary Active Euthanasia, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 20.
9. Quill et al., supra note 8, at 1383; Miller et al., supra note 4, at 119.
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but with no oversight or regulation, or consultation with col-
leagues.' That state of affairs, it is argued, cannot fail to be a
worse situation than one where the practice is brought out into
the open and clear standards are formulated and implemented.
The covert practice of PAS "compromises the professional integ-
rity of physicians and undermines respect for the law."" In
the same vein, Lawrence 0. Gostin has written that
"[e]stablishing clear rules for the practice rather than benignly
ignoring it will relieve physicians of the secrecy and isolation
imposed by current criminal prohibitions."'
Yet there is at least one problem with this contention. If it is
truly the case that the present statutes forbidding euthanasia
and PAS are widely ignored by physicians, why should we ex-,
pect new statutes to be taken with greater moral and legal
seriousness? There is no available survey or other evidence to
indicate that new laws will bring any increased commitment to
following the law.
However, that is not the only problem. "Reviews of the legal
literature have not identified a single case in which a physician
has been convicted for helping a suffering patient die at the
patient's request." 3 But then why should we expect that there
will be any more convictions under the new laws for violations
than under the present laws? Nor are there any surveys or
other available evidence to suggest that prosecutors will show
more zeal with new laws than with the old ones, or that juries
will display less sympathy for violation of the new rules than
they have for those who transgressed the old rules. 4 It is, in
short, very odd to claim that physicians who now do as they
please, with complete de facto immunity from prosecution, will
10. Miller et al., supra note 4, at 120.
11. Id. at 119.
12. Lawrence 0. Gostin, Drawing a Line Between Killing and Letting Die: The
Law, and Law Reform, on Medically Assisted Dying, 21 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 94, 98
(1993).
13. Miller et al., supra note 4, at 119.
14. Yale Kamisar has discussed the high incidence of jury nullfication during the
1940s and 1950s in the case of "mercy-killers," which refers to those family members
committing euthanasia and assisting in suicide. Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious
Views Against Proposed 'Mercy-Killing' Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 969, 971-73
(1958).
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act differently with new laws, and that the new laws will be
more stringently enforced.
Could it not, however, be said in any case that laws that
lead to few prosecutions or convictions ought to be removed
from the books? Not necessarily. As the New York State Task
Force on Life and Law noted in its report on euthanasia and
PAS, the legal prohibition carries intense symbolic and practical
significance,"5 and "shores up the notion of limits in human
relationships."'6 Even laws that are not enforced can have an
important place, particularly for physicians when they have the
additional support of the traditional Hippocratic prohibition of
PAS.
The legal and moral reasons given in favor of PAS over eu-
thanasia seem no less poorly based. Consider one prominent
line of reasoning in favor of PAS: "[in] assisted suicide, the fi-
nal act is solely the patient's, and the risk of subtle coercion
from doctors, family members, institutions, or other social forces
is greatly reduced. The balance of power between doctor and
patient is more nearly equal in physician-assisted suicide than
in euthanasia."7 Notably, arguments of this kind do not cite
any empirical studies to show there is less coercion and a
greater balance of power. There are no such studies. The claim
is pure assertion, and not a very plausible one at that. To in-
sinuate the idea of suicide into the mind of someone already
grievously suffering can surely be no more difficult than insinu-
ating the idea of euthanasia. Indeed, it could be all the more
manipulative if the insinuated hint was combined with a tacit
flattery of someone's capacity to act on his or her own.
As for the power of doctors, their general prestige as profes-
sionals, who with training and experience are widely thought to
understand better matters of life and death than the rest of us,
and their capacity to give or withhold lethal drugs, already
establishes the power differential between themselves and their
patients. The fact that most of Dr. Kevorkian's patients, if that
is the right word, were perfectly physically capable of commit-
ting suicide by themselves, including most obviously the one
15. See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 140.
16. Id. at 131.
17. Quill et al., supra note 8, at 1381.
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physician he helped to die, suggests that the desire to
medicalize PAS already bespeaks the power and legitimation
conferred by medical approval of it."8
In any event, as Dr. Herbert Hendin has shown, it is perfect-
ly easy for families and physicians to subtly guide someone
toward a PAS choice. 9 In a prominent New York Times Maga-
zine article and a PBS documentary, he contended that there is
easily available public evidence to show exactly how it can be,
and has been, done.2" While strong-willed sick and suffering
people may be able to resist patent and gross coercion, they
may have far more difficulty contending with well-meaning
manipulation and gentle, discreet suggestion. The most success-
ful form of manipulation is to lead a person to think that some-
one else's idea is actually his or her own, or to nudge that
person's already existing ambivalence one way or the other.
There is an additional consideration about PAS that needs
reflection. In the case of euthanasia, where a physician would
commonly give a lethal injection or radically increase a dose of
morphine fully and directly intending death, the equivalent of a
paper trail exists, at least in the hospital. The use of the lethal
pharmaceutical agents will have to be recorded somewhere, and
that can be traced. In the instance of PAS, however, the physi-
cian can more easily cover his or her tracks; the necessary pills,
to be consumed all at once, can be prescribed in typical doses
over a long period of time, and no one would be the wiser. This
possibility, we surmise, is no doubt one explanation why the
alleged common practice of PAS is so difficult to detect and
prosecute, even if the authorities are willing to do so.
We can hardly fail to note, moreover, that the perfect formu-
la for combining legal obfuscation and patient seduction is
when a doctor says something like the following to a patient:
I perfectly understand how much you would like to be re-
lieved of your terrible pain and suffering, which seems so
meaningless. Like other patients of mine, you may have
18. Herbert Hendin, Seduced by Death: Doctors, Patients, and the Dutch Cure, 10
IssuEs L. & MED. 123, 131 (1994).
19. Herbert Hendin, Selling Death and Dignity, 25 HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-
June 1995, at 19.
20. Id.
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considered suicide as a peaceful way out. I am sorry I can-
not help you if you have had such thoughts. But I want to
warn you that if you take more than twenty of the pills I
have been prescribing to help you with your pain, you are
going to die quietly and quickly in your sleep. So please be
careful, doing what you know is best.
III. REGULATING THE UNREGULATABLE
We have stressed two objections to PAS-that there is no
reason to believe that new laws or regulations will bring more
honesty and oversight into the practice, and that PAS is no less
subject to coercion and a doctor-patient power imbalance than
euthanasia. Both of those issues, however, touch on a still deep-
er problem, revealing the most fundamental flaw in regulatory
proposals. If it is true, as it indubitably is, that "decisions
about medical treatment are normally made in the privacy of
the doctor-patient relationship,"2' then an obvious question
must be asked: how is it possible, or could it ever be possible,
to monitor and regulate those decisions regarding PAS that
occur within the ambit of that privacy? How can there be over-
sight of those discussions, decisions, and transactions which
must remain secret, and the confidentiality of which is protect-
ed by state statutes prohibiting unauthorized access to medical
records? Is that not the legal equivalent of squaring the cir-
cle-regulating the unregulatable? If it is true that "[p]hysicians
and patients have a unity of interest in defending and promot-
ing the right of privacy that protects decisionmaking in the
doctor-patient relationship from irruptive interference by the
state,"22 then where does that leave the regulation of PAS?
There are two possible ways to proceed here: either we can
station a policeman in every doctor's office and next to every
sickbed to monitor all conversations, or we can depend upon the
individual physician to voluntarily reveal that he or she has
been part of an agreement to pursue PAS. Since the former
course would both violate doctor-patient confidentiality and be
21. Miller et al., supra note 4 at 119.
22. George J. Annas et al., The Right of Privacy Protects the Doctor-Patient Rela-
tionship, 263 JAMA 858, 861 (1990).
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utterly impractical, only the latter option is available. But that
course means, in effect, that any PAS regulation must, in the
end, be physician self-regulated; no one hears, or can hear,
what goes on between doctors and patients. Physicians, then,
must be willing to come forward to say that they are contem-
plating PAS and are willing to abide by whatever the control-
ling statutes determine. Only if the physicians take that step
can the law be followed, and only then is outside regulation
and monitoring meaningful.
We submit that maintaining the privacy of the physician-
patient relationship and the confidentiality of these delibera-
tions is fundamentally incompatible with meaningful oversight
and adherence to any statutory regulations. What if a physician
decides not to come forward? A patient might want to keep his
suicide private. Or the doctor may decide that the regulatory
specifications have not been met, but nonetheless be sympathet-
ic to the patient's request. It is not difficult to imagine many
circumstances in which either the physician or the patient, or
both, would prefer to keep the agreement secret. How can that
situation be monitored or regulated? How could abuses be de-
tected if a physician wrongly decided to induce someone to
consider, and then use, PAS? Of course, there could be risk on
the physician's part: a patient might decide to tell someone else
after all, and that person could blow the whistle. Otherwise,
the possibility of public regulation is simply nonexistent. No
one could have known what Dr. Timothy Quill did with and for
his patient, Diane, had he not chosen to make it public.2" No
new laws will or can change that situation. Precisely the princi-
ple that allows doctors and patients to reach private agree-
ments--doctor-patient confidentiality-no less assures them that
PAS decisions can continue to be effectively hidden.
The contention that PAS should be treated as a "nonstandard
medical practice reserved for extraordinary circumstances"'
cuts both ways: extraordinary circumstances for non-disclosure
of PAS agreements can easily exist, particularly when the cir-
cumstances are such that the legal criteria are almost, but not
23. Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision Mak-
ing, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 691, 693 (1991).
24. Miller et al., supra note 4, at 119.
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quite, met. If we concede that extraordinary circumstances can
justify PAS, it is only a short step to using the same argument
to justify concealing PAS. The trouble lies in invoking extraor-
dinary conditions for just about any action.
Consider once again the claim that legalizing PAS would end
the secrecy that now marks its present practice. Why would
that necessarily happen? Why would the impunity with which
doctors now covertly practice it be lessened by the requirement
that they follow new guidelines? In what respect would new
guidelines give patients protection they do not already have? In
what ways would subtle manipulation of suffering patients be
less possible with new laws than with present laws?
Yet the fact that, in the end, all regulation of PAS must, of
necessity, be tantamount to physician self-regulation precludes
any satisfactory answer to such questions. The behavior of
physicians would still be screened from public scrutiny by doc-
tor-patient confidentiality. Yet if new, more permissive laws
would do nothing to change the privacy of doctor-patient agree-
ments, then the cloaked circumstances that make abuse now
possible would have a more overt effect. They would, for in-
stance, morally and legally legitimate the practice and, no
doubt, increase its prevalence. That effect, and not the protec-
tion of vulnerable patients, would probably be the real signifi-
cance of more permissive laws.
IV. SOME PROPOSED GUIDELINES: FINE TOUCHES ON THE
POTEMKIN FACADE
We have laid the emphasis here on the intrinsic obstacles to
effective regulation of PAS. Regardless of how carefully crafted
and nicely drawn PAS regulations can be on paper, that is all
beside the point if doctors alone, or doctors and patients togeth-
er, secretly decide to ignore them altogether or to evade one or
more of their requirements. Nonetheless, it is worth looking at
some efforts in the literature to draft guidelines with the pur-
pose of precluding or minimizing abuse. Even in their own
terms, the actual details of the Potemkin village facade are
riddled with problems.
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In the nature of the case, it can never be easy, legally, to
specify acts justifiable only in extraordinary circumstances.25 A
well-drawn statute must ordinarily work with familiar and
perspicuous standards of a kind that can be treated uniformly
and that do not require, or open the way to, systematically am-
biguous interpretation. Most of us could probably imagine some
extraordinary circumstances that would justify theft and inten-
tional killing, and in such situations prosecutors, juries, and
judges often temper justice with mercy. But it is difficult for
laws to be written that can carefully specify those conditions in
advance; so they must be left to ex post facto judgment and
resolution in the courts.
In any event, consider one prominent set of proposed criteria
and the difficulty of interpretation posed by most of its fea-
tures: severe, unrelenting suffering, not being the result of
inadequate comfort care; repeated request; non-distorted judg-
ment; good doctor-patient relationship; consultation with anoth-
er physician; and clear documentation." Of that list, only the
requirements of a repeated request, consultation with another
physician, and clear documentation are objectively ascertain-
able. The other conditions require difficult interpretations of
verbal and physical behavior, uncertainty as to what is truly
going on in a patient's mind, and an almost certain impossibili-
ty of falsifying otherwise unverifiable claims. No evidence could
establish that a patient is not suffering the severe and unre-
lenting suffering he claims, or which the doctor subsequently
claims the patient claimed.
Moreover, ordinary medical practice and human experience
make clear that there is no obvious correlation between expres-
sions of suffering and actual degree of suffering, and no way of
verifying the latter. Nor is there a correlation between medical
conditions and unbearable suffering, as considerable individual
variation could and does exist.' Repeated requests for PAS do
not prove suffering so much as they prove determination. Exact-
ly this kind of determination would make prima facie plausible
25. Id.
26. Quill et al., supra note 8, at 1381-82.
27. DANIEL CALLAHAN, THE TROUBLED DREAM OF LIFE: IN SEARCH OF A PEACEFUL
DEATH 102 (1993).
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claims that comfort care has failed, and there would be no way,
in the face of a patient's insistence that comfort care had failed,
to prove that it had not. All the cards, so to speak, are in the
hands of the determined patient.
Just how easy this will become for such a patient is made
even clearer in the 1994 proposed set of guidelines.28 Three
features of those guidelines deserve special attention. First,
despite the insistence on the need for special procedures and
independent monitoring, the patient's evaluation of his or her
suffering is the ultimate criterion: "physician-assisted death
becomes a legitimate option only after standard measures for
comfort care have been found unsatisfactory by competent pa-
tients in the context of their own situation and values."29 There
is an obvious tension between the radical subjectivity of this
standard and the emphasis on the otherwise extraordinary
circumstances for which the same guidelines call. Patients, not
doctors, appear to be the ones who will determine what counts
as extraordinary. The patient's views, moreover, may be colored
by unduly pessimistic advice by doctors untrained in palliative
care or unduly influenced by the doctor's own values on pain
and suffering.
Second, the proposed guidelines directly confront two difficult
questions: what about those suffering patients physically unable
to end their own lives, and those who have "unremitting suffer-
ing" but are not terminally ill? The response of the authors is
to opt for a "liberal, inclusive policy with respect to these is-
sues."" In short, in the former case, it would be acceptable for
the physician to perform direct euthanasia (the only way to
effect a liberal policy), even though it would contradict the
stand taken against euthanasia and in favor of PAS in the
document. In the latter case, it will, once again, not be some
reasonably objective standard, but the standards of the patient
that will be determinative. By definition, an individually deter-
mined standard is not a standard.
Third, the proposed guidelines state that "[t]reating physi-
cians would be prohibited from providing lethal treatment with-
28. Miller et al., supra note 4, at 119.
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 120.
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out prior consultation and review by an independent, certified
palliative-care consultant."3  These consultants are to be
backed up by palliative-care committees that would review
"difficult or disputed cases." 2 The problem with this strategy
is that, in the nature of the case, the independent consultant
would have to be someone who has already accepted the morali-
ty of PAS, as would members of the review committees. Thus
from the outset, the deck would be stacked in a direction favor-
able to PAS by eliminating as committee or consultant candi-
dates those on the wrong side of the ethical fence.
In the end, the standards and procedures proposed by these
guidelines accomplish a number of undesirable results: (1) they
open the door very widely to expanded indications for PAS by
including those who are suffering but not terminally ill; (2) they
bring euthanasia in through the back door by apparently per-
mitting it for those patients physically unable to commit sui-
cide; (3) they not only make the system one of physician self-
regulation since they must voluntarily come forward, but also of
patient self-regulation by saying that, in the end, it is the
patient's situation and values, which define last resort and
which are determinative; and (4) while the intent of a pallia-
tive-care consultant and committee might be to avoid rubber-
stamp decisions, the committees themselves are unlikely to
include moral opponents of PAS. In short, the criteria and
methods of these guidelines fail on all counts proposed by the
authors themselves. The guidelines will not necessarily protect
vulnerable patients, preserve physician integrity, assure the
public that PAS will only occur as a last resort, or provide for
the possibility of independent monitoring and regulation (which
will apply only to those physicians who do not choose to keep
their intentions secret).
V. LESSONS FROM THE NETHERLANDS
In this context, it is useful to examine the Dutch situation,
as the Netherlands is the one country in the world that has
had experience in attempting to regulate euthanasia and PAS.
31. Id. at 121.
32. Id.
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Although the Netherlands has yet to enact legislation to de-
criminalize euthanasia and PAS, court decisions and legislative
developments since 1973 have established that doctors may
lawfully perform them in certain circumstances.33 These devel-
opments were fueled, to a considerable degree, by the support
of public opinion and of the main representative group of Dutch
physicians, The Royal Dutch Medical Association (KNMG).'
In 1984, the KNMG was the first to set forth the criteria
that, until recently, were taken to be clearly determinative by
the courts and the Parliament. 5  The criteria are (1)
voluntariness, which is a patient's free-will choice; (2) a well-
considered request, which is a request made by a patient who
has carefully thought about his or her request; (3) a durable
death wish, which is a persistent request; (4) unacceptable
suffering, which is suffering that is persistent, unbearable, and
hopeless; and (5) consultation and reporting, which is a consul-
tation with a colleague and another doctor and accurate report-
ing on the cause of death.36
Although often reiterated by the Dutch courts, the criteria
are subject to one general exception and are open in principle
to being set aside altogether. The general condition results from
the acceptability of the defense of necessity or force majeure. By
that principle, a doctor who can claim an exception to the crite-
ria on the basis of "irresistible compulsion or necessity"
[overmacht] is not criminally liable." Necessity means that in
the doctor's judgment, the situation is one where euthanasia or
PAS is called for because of a "conflict of interests" in the "light
of medical ethics."3 The doctor's duty to alleviate suffering
outweighs his or her duty not to kill. Until recently, the medi-
33. See John Keown, The Law and Practice of Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 108
LAW Q. REV. 51 (1992); H.J.J. Leenen, Euthanasia, Assistance to Suicide and the
Law: Developments in the Netherlands, 8 HEALTH POLY 197, 200-02 (1987).
34. Leenen, supra note 33, at 198-216.
35. Id. at 198-99 (relating the circumstances leading up to the publication of the
guidelines).
36. Guidelines for Euthanasia, 3 ISSUES L. & MED. 429, 431-33 (Walker Lagerweg
trans., 1988).
37. John Keown, Some Reflections on Euthanasia in the Netherlands, in EUTHA-
NASIA, CLINICAL PRACTICE AND THE LAW 193, 195 (Luke Gormally ed., 1994); see also
J.K.M. Gevers, Legal Developments Concerning Active Euthanasia on Request in the
Netherlands, 1 BIOETHICS 156, 159 (1987).
38. Keown, supra note 37, at 195-96.
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cal profession and the courts had emphasized that this defense
was available only in cases where the patient had freely re-
quested death. 9
Two recent cases, however, exceeded even that defense. In
the first case, the Supreme Court of Holland held that the
patient need not even be suffering physical, let alone terminal,
illness and that it could be lawful to assist a mother, who was
depressed over losing two sons, to kill herself." Then, in April
1995, a district court exonerated a physician who had
euthanized a newborn with spina bifida at the request of its
parents.4 Moreover, it is a highly idiosyncratic understanding
of "the norms of medical ethics" to claim that a duty to allevi-
ate suffering outweighs a duty not to kill. There is no basis in
the traditions of medical ethics to sustain such a claim.
It is not our intention here to examine either the necessity
principle or the two recent court cases. We simply note that
although the Dutch have supposedly established criteria, they
seem perfectly willing to set the criteria aside in the name of
necessity. The criteria become, in effect, dispensable guidelines
rather than essential requirements. This situation is reminis-
cent of the kind of strategic and systematic vagueness of the
proposed American statute,42 which would set aside its criteria
for those physically unable to commit suicide and for those who,
though not terminal, are judged to be suffering unbearably. The
only point we would make is that with such criteria, it is hard
to know just where a line could be drawn in theory or in prac-
tice.
For our purposes here, the more salient information about
the Dutch situation is how the judicially legitimated practice of
euthanasia and PAS have been implemented. What can we
learn about the success of regulation? The best information on
this subject comes from a survey commissioned by the Dutch
Government's Commission on Euthanasia appointed in January
of 1990.' The survey, directed by Professor P.J. van der Maas,
39. See, e.g., id. at 199 (discussing the requirement of "voluntariness").
40. Doctor Unpunished for Dutch Suicide, N.Y. TIMEs, June 22, 1994, at A10.
41. Dutch Doctor Free After Prosecution Proves Murder Case, AM. MED. NEWS,
Dec. 4, 1995, at 4.
42. Miller et al., supra note 4.
43. John Keown, Further Reflections on Euthanasia in the Netherlands in the
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encompassed a sample of 406 physicians, who were guaranteed
anonymity in providing information to the researchers.'
Based on the physicians sampled, the official results showed
that out of a total of 129,000 deaths, there were 2300 cases of
euthanasia' and 400 cases of assisted suicide." Additionally,
and most strikingly, there were 1000 cases of intentional termi-
nation of life without explicit request (nonvoluntary euthana-
sia).47
Remarking that the narrow Dutch definition of euthanasia
excludes both intentional life-shortening by omission and termi-
nation without the patient's request, one commentator con-
cludes that the van der Maas survey reveals 10,558 cases in
which it was the doctor's explicit purpose to shorten life, by act
or by omission." This commentator points out, moreover, that
the majority of the cases were about nonvoluntary euthanasia;
in 5450 cases the patient made no explicit request for euthana-
sia.49 If cases in which doctors said it was partly their purpose
to shorten life are included, the number of cases swells to
26,350 and 15,158 respectively.5"
This is a disturbing set of figures in its own right, rendered
all the more distressing by the gloss put on them by the com-
mission that had initiated the survey. While the commission
deplored the act of euthanasia without the explicit request of
competent patients, the commission was not nearly so hard on
those acts carried out on the incompetent:
The ultimate justification for the intervention is in both
cases the patient's unbearable suffering. So, medically
speaking, there is little difference between these situations
Light of the Remmelink Report and the Van Der Maas Survey, in EUTHANASIA CLIN-
ICAL PRACTICE AND THE LAw 219, 219-20 (Luke Gormally ed., 1994).
44. Id. at 221-22.
45. Euthanasia is defined as the "intentional action to terminate a person's life,
performed by someone other than the person concerned upon request of the latter."
46. Keown, supra note 43, at 224-25.
47. See H.J.J. LEENEN, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR GEZONDHEIDSRECHT 48 (1994); P.J. van
der Maas et al., Euthanasia and Other Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life,
338 THE LANCET 669-74 (1991).
48. Keown, supra note 37, at 227, 232.
49. Id. at 232.
50. Keown, supra note 43, at 224.
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and euthanasia, because in both cases patients are involved
who suffer terribly.... The degrading situation the patient
is in confronts the doctor with a case of force majeure.5"
Therefore, the criteria set by the KMNG and the courts were
not only ignored by the physicians who acted without a request,
but also regarded as dispensable by the commission, which
attempted to justify the physicians' actions.52 Even in those
cases where the criteria were supposedly met, many cases
lacked the quality of intolerable suffering, and there were many
others in which euthanasia was not the last resort.53 The
avoidance of suffering appears to have been as much a consid-
eration for many physicians as the relief of suffering.
What did the physicians actually report? The majority of
cases were, and are still, unreported and illegally certified as
deaths from "natural causes."' In 1990, the year covered by
the van der Maas survey, only 454 cases were reported.55
Therefore, even if the survey's low estimate of 2700 cases of
voluntary euthanasia and PAS is accepted as accurate, over
seventy percent of cases went unreported. The officially report-
ed figures of late have, however, improved considerably-1303
cases were reported in 1993 and 1417 in 1994.56 Even so, that
number is still barely more than half the Remmelink estimated
euthanasia total, and does not include the unreported, nonvol-
untary cases. Given such figures, it would appear that euthana-
sia is not at all effectively regulated in The Netherlands.57 As
51. Medische beslissingen rond het levenseinde. Rapport van de Commissie
onderzoek medisehe praktijk inzake euthanasie, Sdu Uitgeverij Plantijnstraat, 's-
Gravenhage (1991) (quoting Keown, supra note 33, at 229). "Force majeure" is synon-
ymous in Dutch usage with "necessity."
52. Keown, supra note 43, at 239.
53. Id at 232-33.
54. Id. at 235.
55. Id.
56. JoHN KEOWN, EUTHANASIA IN THE NETHERLANDS 296 (1995) (citing
Jaaverslaag Openbaar Ministerie 1994, Ministerie van Justitie, Den Haag, 1995).
57. See also HERBERT HENDN, SEDUCED BY DEATH: DOcTORS, PATIENTS AND THE
DUTCH CURE (forthcoming 1996); Alexander M. Capron, Euthanasia in the Nether-
lands: American Observations, 22 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar. 1992 at 30, 30-33;
J.K.M. Gevers, Legislation on Euthanasia: Recent Developments in The Netherlands,
18 J. MED. ETHIcs 138 (1992); Henk A.M.J. ten Have & Jos V.M. Welie, Euthanasia:
Normal Medical Practice?, 22 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar. 1992 at 34, 34-38;
Hendin, supra note 18; H. Jochemsen, Euthanasia in Holland: An Ethical Critique of
the New Law, 20 J. MED. ETmICS 212 (1994); Maurice A-M. de Wachter, Euthanasia
18 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:001
with the laws proposed in the United States, the Dutch guide-
lines depend upon the willingness of doctors voluntarily to re-
port what they do. It is evident that most doctors do not; cer-
tainly not those substantial numbers who engage in nonvolun-
tary euthanasia. As we turn to a closer look at the wording of
the Oregon statute," keep the Dutch figures in mind. The
Dutch have failed to monitor and regulate euthanasia and phy-
sician-assisted suicide. Can we expect to do any better?
VI. WHAT ARE WE DOING IN THE UNITED STATES?
We examined the provisions of bills pending as of June 1995
in twelve state legislatures: California," Colorado," Connecti-
cut,"' Maine,6  Massachusetts,63  Michigan,64  New Hamp-
shire,6" New York,6" Oregon," Vermont," Washington, 9
and Wisconsin."° Three additional bills which failed during
1994-95 in their state legislatures (Maryland, New Mexico, and
Virginia) were not examined. The Oregon statute was passed by
a fifty-one to forty-nine percent margin in November of 1994,71
and will be discussed at length. It has been the almost verba-
tim model for bills pending in six other states: California, Colo-
rado, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont. In
discussing the Oregon statute, therefore, we will be describing
seven bills which may be referred to as "the Oregon model" to
simplify comparisons. Within this group, Vermont's bill has
some unique features which we will note only in passing.7
in the Netherlands, 22 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar. 1992 at 23, 23-30.
58. Or. Laws ch. 3 (I.M. 116) (1995).
59. Cal. A.B. 1080 (1995).
60. Colo. H.B. 95-1308 (1995).
61. Conn. H.B. 1308 (1995).
62. Me. H.P. 552 (1995).
63. Mass. H.B. 3173 (1995).
64. Mich. H.B. 4134, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1995).
65. N.H. H.B. 339 (1995).
66. N.Y. S.B. 5024 (1995).
67. Or. S.B. 907 (1995).
68. Vt. H.B. 335 (1995).
69. Wash. S.B. 5596, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1995).
70. Wis. S.B. 90, 92d Leg., Reg. Sess. (1995).
71. Yale Kamisar, Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Last Bridge to Active Voluntary
Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED 245 (John Keown ed., 1995).
72. Vt. H.B. 335 (1995).
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The legislation pending in Michigan deserves special atten-
tion not only because of its authorization of euthanasia and
PAS, but also because it has extremely broad criteria for eligi-
bility. 3 The status of challenges to Michigan's prohibition of
assisted suicide and the legal status of Dr. Jack Kevorkian are
beyond the scope of this article and are analyzed in depth else-
where. 4 Connecticut's bill is noteworthy for its extreme brevity
because it is set forth in its entirety in a footnote. 5 Connecti-
cut is, at least, to be commended for its intellectual honesty in
acknowledging that the purpose of legalization is the protection
of physicians, not patients. 6
Wisconsin's bill resembles the Oregon model in many re-
spects, but it also includes some unique witnessing require-
ments that further demonstrate the illusory nature of supposed
safeguards." Washington state has constructed a convoluted
and bewildering piece of legislation that illustrates, among
other things, the danger of assuming that physicians, hospital
administrators, lay people-indeed anyone-can be absolutely
certain of what the legislation requires."
To make matters worse, there is an astonishing level of am-
biguity, if not outright obfuscation, created by the terminology
used not only in the body of the various pieces of proposed
legislation, but in many of the titles by which the bills are
introduced and would, presumably, be known. Before turning to
73. Mich. H.B. 4134, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1995).
74. See Kamisar, supra note 71, at 240-248.
75. "An Act Concerning Physician Assisted Suicide":
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General
Assembly convened:
That section 53a\56 of the general statutes be amended to provide an
aftirmative defense to manslaughter in the second degree for physician
assisted suicide if (1) the physician is licensed in this state, (2) the
victim made a written request to the physician for the medication
which was self-administered, (3) the victim was eighteen years of age
or older and able to understand the nature and consequences of such
medication and (4) the victim was deemed to be in terminal condition.
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE: To provide an affirmative defense to
manslaughter in the second degree for physician assisted suicide.
Conn. S.B. 334, Reg. Sess. (1995).
76. See id.
77. Wis. S.B. 90, 92nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (1995).
78. Wash. S.B. 5596, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1995).
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the bodies of those pieces of legislation, a comment is in order
on their titles.
VII. IS THERE A DICTIONARY IN THE HOUSE?
The importance of using clearly defined terms and of forth-
right acknowledgment of the nature of the acts being contem-
plated would seem axiomatic and self-evident. Regrettably, the
campaign to legalize PAS and euthanasia has been marked not
only by a proliferation of confusing terminology, but also by a
kind of Orwellian doublespeak that has been acknowledged by
at least one proponent as deliberate and politically motivated.
"Aid-in-dying" is one of the euphemistic and perhaps deliberate-
ly misleading phrases employed in both public opinion polls and
in proposed state statutes. Derek Humphry, former president of
the pro-euthanasia Hemlock Society and author of Final Exit,79
admitted that use of the precise terms suicide and euthanasia,
instead of aid-in-dying, helped defeat the first attempts to le-
galize these practices in Washington. ° Humphry acknowledged
that aid in dying can mean "anything from a physician's lethal
injection all the way to holding hands with a dying patient and
saying, 'I love you.'"" This semantic ambiguity seems to have
been used to exploit widespread fears of abandonment at the
end of life and to garner public support for legalization.
The phrase more widely used now than aid-in-dying to refer
to physician-assisted suicide is "death with dignity," which is no
improvement. This phrase is borrowed directly from living will
legislation, and therefore risks confusion in the minds of voters
as to what acts are covered. In Michigan, "death with dignity"
covers the physician's prescription of lethal doses of medication
for the patient to commit suicide as well as the physician's
direct administration of lethal drugs to the patient.82 Appar-
ently abandoning the vagueness of "aid-in-dying," Washington
has chosen instead to call its statute the "Terminally Ill Patient
79. DEREK HUMPHRY, FINAL EXIT (1991).
80. John Leo, Stop Murdering the Language!, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 12,
1993, at 23.
81. Id.
82. Mich. H.B. 4134, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1995).
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Act of 1995,""3 a title that would seem indistinguishable from
a living will statute. Elsewhere, "death with dignity" refers, for
the time being at least, to physician-assisted suicide, and also
to withdrawal of life support.'
The persistent use of euphemisms may be intended to soften
the political landscape and lower the temperature of the debate,
but it can also suggest a degree of intellectual dishonesty and
potential abuse of public trust that renders promises of regula-
tion and good faith adherence to guidelines difficult to believe.
The confusion is obvious to a casual observer-the use of a
single phrase to cover acts which for some time have been le-
gal, as well as acts which have traditionally been prohibited,
raises concerns regarding motive and intent.5
83. Wash. S.B. 5596, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1995).
84. The variety of titles used to designate state living will statutes, or those
permitting a variety of advance directives for authorizing the withdrawal or withhold-
ing of life-sustaining treatment, gives some idea of the extraordinary melange of ter-
minology and the lack of consistency already prevalent in this area of state law:
Hawaii's "Medical Treatment Decisions Act," Idaho's "Natural Death Act," Indiana's
"Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures Act," Iowa's "Life-Sustaining Procedures
Act," Kansas's "Natural Death Act," Maine's "Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill
Act," Minnesota's "Adult Health Care Decisions Act," Mississippi's "Withdrawal of
Life-Saving Mechanisms Act," New Hampshire's "Terminal Care Document Act," North
Dakota's "Rights of the Terminally Ill Act," Oklahoma's "Hydration & Nutrition for
Incompetent Patients Act," South Carolina's "Death With Dignity Act," Utah's "Person-
al Choice and Living Will Act," and so on.
To illustrate the confusion, the legislation intended to authorize euthanasia
and/or PAS is similarly titled: Washington's is the 'Terminally Ill Patient Act of
1995"; Oregon, Wisconsin, California, New York, Maine, New Hampshire, and Massa-
chusetts have all chosen the title "Death with Dignity"; Colorado's is the "Dignity in
Death Act"; Vermont has titled its legislation "An Act Relating to Rights of Terminal-
ly Ill Patients"; and, with a commendable display of clarity, Connecticut calls its leg-
islation "An Act Concerning Physician Assisted Suicide."
85. While it is not the purpose of the authors to delve into matters of intent, the
use of the same or similar terminology for these two acts (withholding and withdraw-
ing treatment on the one hand, and deliberately putting someone to death on the
other) may reasonably raise questions about the motives of the movement behind
legalization. It is reasonable to ask why there is such a need to be unclear about the
exact purpose of the legislation.
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VIII. THE SITUATION IN OREGON
On November 8, 1994, Oregon's "Death with Dignity Act""6
was voted into law in that state by a very slight margin.87 It
was due to go into effect one month later, but on November 23,
U.S. District Judge Michael Hogan enjoined it until he could
hear arguments regarding its constitutionality." Subsequently
blocked by a temporary restraining order and then a prelimi-
nary injunction, it finally culminated in a hearing on April 19,
1995.89
Judge Hogan heard arguments from opponents of the statute
about the potential for abuse." The state's attorney general
argued, rather chillingly, on behalf of Oregon that the potential
for abuse was irrelevant to deciding the constitutionality of the
statute.91 Assistant Attorney General Steve Bushong opined
that "[s]ome instances of inappropriate applications are not
enough" to invalidate the statute on due process grounds.92
Then, Judge Hogan asked the defense attorneys, "[a]t what
point do you draw the constitutional line?"93 Could a quadri-
plegic be eligible for the option of assisted suicide? What about
nine-year-old girls who fail a school exam? The line was un-
clear. 4 Judge Hogan found the law unconstitutional on August
3, 1995; his decision is on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
Oregon's "Death With Dignity Act" limits PAS to patients
with a life expectancy of six months or less due to a terminal
illness.95 It requires that the patient wait fifteen days after
having made an oral request to his or her physician for a pre-
scription for a lethal amount of medication with which to com-
86. Or. Laws ch. 3 (I.M. 16) (1995).
87. See supra note 71.
88. Judge Hears Suicide Law Arguments, THE REGSTER-GuARD (Eugene, Oregon),
Apr. 19, 1995 at 1A.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 6A.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Or. Laws ch. 3 (I.M. 16) § 1.01(12) (1995).
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mit suicide. 6 During the waiting period, the physician must
inform the patient of his or her diagnosis and prognosis. Pre-
sumably, this has been done at least once already since a re-
quest for PAS is supposed to be invalid if there is a life expec-
tancy of longer than six months. The physician must also in-
form the patient of alternatives such as hospice care, pain con-
trol, and other comfort measures. 8 A decision to proceed with
PAS after receiving this information constitutes an "informed
decision."99
The physician must also assess the patient's decisionmaking
ability and find that the patient is capable of making health
care decisions..0 and is "acting voluntarily."'0 ' As a compo-
nent of this evaluation, the patient is referred to a consulting
physician for confirmation of the first physician's diagnosis and
prognosis and for confirmation of decisionmaking capacity.
0 2
If either physician believes that the patient suffers from a psy-
chological or psychiatric condition (not specified) or that the
patient's judgment is impaired by depression, the patient must
be referred for counseling regarding this impairment.0 3 De-
pression, by itself, does not invalidate the request for PAS."°
The patient whose diagnosis and prognosis are confirmed by a
consulting physician, and whose judgment is found unimpaired,
must then make an additional oral request and also complete a
written request.0 5 The patient must wait another forty-eight
hours and then may be given the prescription.'
The statute also provides that the patient may change his or
her mind and rescind the request, and physicians are permitted
to refuse participation.'07 The attending physician must make
a note in the patient's record that the above steps have been
96. Id. § 3.08.
97. Id. § 1.01(7).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. § 1.01(6) ("capable" is defined as "not incapable").
101. Id. § 2.02(1).
102. Id. § 3.02.
103. Id. § 3.03.
104. Id. (specifying that depression must be such that causes "impaired judgment"
in order to invalidate a request for PAS).
105. Id. § 3.06.
106. Id. § 3.06, 3.08.
107. Id. § 3.07.
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taken, and file in the patient's medical record a report of any
counseling and a copy of the patient's written request.0 8 A
sample of these records will be reviewed each year by the
Health Division of Oregon."9 Also, the public is prohibited
from access to any information or records collected about the
practice of PAS in Oregon, including compliance or non-compli-
ance with the provisions of the statute."' Anyone participat-
ing in PAS in good faith is immune from civil or criminal liabil-
ity."' Altering or forging requests or rescissions of requests
without the patient's permission are Class A felonies." Final-
ly, Oregon's "Death With Dignity Act" stipulates that actions
taken pursuant to the statute are not considered suicide or as-
sisted suicide under the law."'
Six other states have debated virtually identical laws."
Oregon's model therefore has already been accorded widespread
credence and support. A superficial reading of the provisions
might suggest to the casual observer that Oregon's is a reason-
able approach, with adequate safeguards such as a written
request and an evaluation of the competence of the patient.
However, the problem is not that there are too few safeguards,
or that there should be more, but that they simply will not
work.
The difficulty lies not in the procedural steps, but rather in
the nature of law, the nature of medicine, the nature of the
doctor-patient relationship, and the nature of the act itself.
First, legitimizing PAS contemplates a reconstruction of the
doctor-patient relationship to allow physicians to help in the
taking of life, while at the same time upholding and maintain-
ing the privacy and confidentiality of that relationship. Second,
Oregon's procedural safeguards cannot change the fact that
there is no legally meaningful self-limiting aspect to the prac-
tice of PAS, and consequently, the safeguards are ineffective in
108. Id. § 3.09.
109. Id. § 3.11.
110. Id.
111. Id. § 4.01(1).
112. Id. § 4.02(1).
113. Id. § 3.14.
114. Those states are Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire,
and Wisconrin
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limiting the practice of PAS to competent patients or to those
who are terminally ill and capable of self-administering lethal
medications. Third, Oregon's statute relies, as do the other
legislative proposals, on assumptions about the certainty of
medical judgment and the determinacy of such terms as
"terminal," "competent," "capable" and "voluntary." We will
demonstrate the fallacy of such assumptions and, therefore, the
danger of regarding these concepts as restrictive limits or safe-
guards on the practice of PAS or euthanasia. Finally, the
remarkable absence in Oregon's law of statutory reporting
requirements that would address the need to investigate and
stop any unauthorized killing renders the notion of procedural
safeguards highly questionable as an antidote to abuse of the
practice.
Oregon's approach may well be regarded as the standard for
future attempts at legalization. Yet, without any means of eval-
uating the practice even retrospectively, and no means of public
oversight at all, how is the standard to be understood or used
for comparison? Oregon proposes to achieve a safe way to limit
PAS to those who request it, but this is unachievable and in-
herently impossible. Examination of the legislation proposed
elsewhere will lead to the same conclusion. We now turn to the
structure of the statutes, an analysis of the conceptual terrain
on which they are built, and to the quicksand in which they
are mired.
IX. A TOUR OF THE CONCEPTUAL LANDSCAPE
For decades, proponents of legalized euthanasia and assisted
suicide have bolstered their arguments with promises of safe-
guards, and we will examine the proposed statutes from that
perspective. At least four such safeguards are consistently men-
tioned in the literature: 1) consent; 2) mental competence or
capacity; 3) voluntariness; and 4) limited or restricted eligibili-
ty."1 We would add that a serious effort to address the poten-
tial abuse that even PAS proponents agree is inevitable..6
115. Brock, supra note 8, at 20; Marcia Angell, Euthanasia, 319 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1348 (1988); Miller et al., supra note 4, at 120.
116. See Margaret Battin, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Risks of Abuse: Can We
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would also require, at a minimum, the following: 5) witnesses;
6) a definition of what constitutes abuse; and 7) specific re-
quirements to report, investigate and punish abuse. By using
these seven categories, we will examine the provisions of the
remaining bills introduced in 1995 in the United States to de-
termine the degree to which these problems are successfully
addressed.
A. Consent
Given that some prominent proponents of legalization ad-
vance their regulatory framework as "experimental" and also
propose research into, among other things, the methods used in
PAS,"7 while others have characterized the Oregon statute
legalizing PAS as "a bold experiment,""8 it seems appropriate
to refer briefly to the history and ethics of consent for human
experimentation as well as therapeutic medicine. Consent, after
all, has been considered the heart of research ethics since the
Nuremburg Code was promulgated at the end World War
II." Valid informed consent is also claimed to be the primary
safeguard against abuse of the practice of euthanasia,' ° and
the practice that will allegedly always serve to distinguish "us"
from "them" (Nazi practitioners). Given the assumption that the
worst abuse would be killing a patient without consent, we will
begin our analysis with the concept of consent, to assess wheth-
Learn Anything from the Netherlands?, 20 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 133 (1992);
Brock, supra note 8, at 10; Brody, supra note 7; Quill et al., supra note 8.
117. Miller et al., supra note 4, at 122.
118. Ann Alpers & Bernard Lo, Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon: A Bold Ex-
periment, 274 JAMA 483 (1995).
119. Jay Katz, The Consent Principle of the Nuremberg Code: Its Significance Then
and Now, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE 227 (George J. Annas &
Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992). While the book concerns the continuing impact of the
Nuremburg Code on human experimentation, Jay Katz makes the point that, prior to
the nineteenth century, when the curative powers of medicine were quite limited,
consent was seldom sought or considered necessary because the physician was pre-
sumed to act in the patient's interests for the patient's well being. "However, with
the advent of the age of science, a radical break occurred in medical practice: Novel
experiment interventions now served not solely-and often not at all-patients' but
also future patients' or science's, interests . . .the distinction between patient and re-
search subject became, and ever since has remained, blurred." Id. at 229.
120. Brock, supra note 8, at 10-11.
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er and how the requirement of informed consent may be consid-
ered a safeguard against abuse of PAS.
Nearly forty years ago, a leading proponent of euthanasia,
Glanville Williams, rested his arguments entirely on the con-
cept of voluntariness or consent.'2 Subsequent literature has
maintained that consent to the practice of either assisted sui-
cide or euthanasia is the key to preventing abuse, limiting the
practice to those who are awake, alert and want to die, 1 2 and
assuaging the fears of those who oppose legalization, and/or
those who do not wish to be put to death.
A long line of court decisions and modem codes of medical
ethics uphold the centrality of consent as the linchpin of patient
participation in medical decisionmaking.' Consent has never
been proposed, however, as a means of preventing physician
error or physician incompetence, or as a means of evaluating
the physician's motives or moral commitments. In theory, the
function of consent is to support the patient's right to be free of
unwanted touching.' In practice, consent has all too often
become a tool of risk management for purposes of creating a
liability-proof record of patient care in the event of lawsuits. In
practice, the pieces of paper handed to patients for signature
prior to treatment, accompanied sometimes by a conversation,
focus almost exclusively on the potential risks for which the
hospital or other care providers will not be held liable in the
event such risks materialize. In practice, why should this pro-
cess be any different for PAS or euthanasia? Specifically, can
any statute ensure a consent process that is better or different
than the typical consent process currently experienced by pa-
tients throughout the medical system? Whether giving consent
121. GLANVLLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTIY OF Lin AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1957).
122. Norman L. Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical
Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERs L. REv. 228,
261 (1973) ("So long as careful attention is paid to the capacity of a person to re-
quest euthanasia, there is a large gap between voluntary euthanasia and involuntary
elimination of social misfits.").
123. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972); Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr.
Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Natanson v. Kline,
350 P.2d 1093 (1960), clarified in, 354 P.2d 670 (1960); Schloendorff v. Society of
New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676 (R.I.
1972).
124. See, e.g., Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 92.
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for an X-ray, an arteriogram, or a CT-scan, patients everywhere
experience a routinely delivered, often perfunctory, recitation of
the pros and cons of recommended treatments. Communication
skills vary widely from physician to physician, and listening
skills are even more variable and even less likely to be
adequate.'25
An additional factor enters into this process which is disturb-
ingly relevant to the notion of valid consent to euthanasia or
PAS-the physician's influence, subtle or overt, on the patient's
choice.'26 An American psychiatrist who has observed and re-
searched the practice of euthanasia in the Netherlands notes
that "Id]octors in both the Netherlands and the United States
are insufficiently sensitive to the influence a doctor has on a
patient's decision in these matters." 7 As the New York State
Task Force points out:
Illness is a quintessential state of vulnerability; it entails
a loss of confidence in one's body and one's future. Serious
illness also brings with it a loss of physical freedom and the
ability to engage in the activities by which we define our-
selves. Patients bring this vulnerability to their relationship
with physicians. Physicians in turn hold the knowledge and
expertise patients may desperately need, adding to the
profound dependence that characterizes the doctor-patient
relationship.
This dependence is manifested in many aspects of the
doctor-patient relationship. Patients turn to their doctors for
information about their diagnosis and prognosis, the likely
symptoms of illness, and treatment alternatives. Through
their tone, the encouragement they provide or withhold, and
125. See ERIC J. CASSELL, TALKING wrrH PATIENTS 223 (Stanley J. Reiser ed.,
1985) (as a meticulous and painstaking personal analysis of the doctor-patient interac-
tion based on theory presented in the first volume, these books are considered clas-
sics in their field); see generally COMMUNICATING WITH MEDICAL PATIENTS (Moira
Stewart & Debra Roter eds., 1989) (a collection of papers presented at an interna-
tional symposium of experts in medical communications; most of the papers are re-
ports of original research. Among the most often cited findings is that doctors typical-
ly interrupt their patients' communication within 18 seconds).
126. See BERNARD BARBER, INFORMED CONSENT IN MEDICAL THERAPY AND RE-
SEARCH (1980). Barber argues that real consent to treatment is not possible because,
in most cases, physicians can influence a patient to agree to whatever the practitio-
ner recommends.
127. Hendin, supra note 18, at 131.
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the way they present the information available, physicians
can often determine the patient's choice.'
Over the course of some eighty years of Anglo-American ju-
risprudence and bioethics, medical consent has evolved into
informed consent, and in most jurisdictions, a certain amount
and kind of information must be imparted to the patient in
order for the consent to be valid. 9 The common law stan-
dards of what constitutes adequate information vary from phy-
sician-based 30  to patient-centered 3' and most are some-
where between the two. Ultimately, the quality of the informa-
tion, the understanding, and the consent are dependent as
much on the skills of the physician as on the capabilities of the
patient. Decades of court decisions and medical codes of ethics
emphasizing the centrality of informed consent have not result-
ed in any uniform standard for evaluating this concept or
interaction in practice. It remains, by definition, a process gov-
erned by the individuals involved. At best, the courts have
specified the kinds of information that must be included to
meet the patient-centered standards. 2  or physician-based
standards. 3' However, unlike other medical malpractice litiga-
tion in which the adequacy of consent may be disputed by the
patient or the patient's death itself is considered evidence of
negligence, no patient in a situation involving PAS can allege
inadequacy of consent, and death is presumed to be the desired
outcome. Retrospective evaluation of the adequacy of the infor-
mation or the patient's understanding of it would be virtually
impossible. Not only would the patient be unavailable, but the
evidence available for examination would be very limited,
consisting primarily of the patient's record which is written by
the physician.
128. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 121-122 (emphasis added).
The Task Force was comprised of eight physicians, five ministers or priests, two
rabbis, two non-physician bioethicists, a representative of the New York Civil Liber-
ties Union, the state's Commissioner on Quality of Care for the Mentally Disabled,
two nurses, including one nurse-attorney, and three other attorneys.
129. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972); Salgo v. Leland Stanford,
Jr., Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
130. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960).
131. Cooper v. Roberts, 286 AK2d 647, 650 (Pa. 1971).
132. E.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972).
133. E.g., Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 1.
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While the requirement of an informed decision is considered
central to the legality of PAS or euthanasia, we do not believe
that the legislators have succeeded in crafting bills that over-
come the problems we have outlined.
1. Legislative Approaches to Informed Consent for
PAS/Euthanasia
Oregon's "Death With Dignity Act" and the six bills modeled
on it provide the following definition:
"Informed decision" means a decision, made by a qualified
patient, to request and obtain a prescription to end his or
her life in a humane and dignified manner, that is based on
an appreciation of the relevant facts, and is made after
being fully informed by the attending physician of:
(a) his or her medical diagnosis;
(b) his or her prognosis;
(c) the potential risk associated with taking the medica-
tion to be prescribed;
(d) the probable result of taking the medication to be
prescribed;
(e) the feasible alternatives, including, but not limited to,
comfort care, hospice care, and pain control."3
Several observations can be made. First, this is a passive
approach to informed consent because it views the process as
involving primarily, if not exclusively, the imparting of informa-
tion by the physician to the patient. Second, this provision
contemplates only providing information about pain medication,
hospice care, and other comfort measures, and does not require
that any of these alternatives be tried and/or found inadequate.
Is the consent valid if it is based only on hearing that some
additional relief might be available from analgesics, without
ever having tried them? What has happened to the persistent
promise of euthanasia advocates that the practice would only be
permitted as a last resort, when all other means of relief had
been tried and found wanting? What of Howard Brody's insis-
tence that providing the patient with the means to kill himself
or herself would only be done in the context of medical failure,
134. Or. Laws ch. 3 (I.M. 16) § 3.01(2) (1995).
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when the treatment itself had made death agonizing and horri-
ble?35 None of the pending bills examined requires that pain
control be attempted, improved, or found inadequate prior to a
request for suicide. l 6 Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
the definition offered in the Oregon statute is a circular one: an
informed decision is a decision made after being given certain
information.
The question arises whether these weaknesses could be cured
by requiring some evidence of comprehension and appreciation
of the gravity of the decision on the part of the patient. Or,
more tempting, would it be possible to craft a statute requiring
that all other means of pain control and relief of suffering be
tried and exhausted? No. That possibility is foreclosed by the
assertion of autonomy and self-determination as the basis for
the legislation. Having constructed the legal edifice on a foun-
dation of self-determination and autonomy (even assuming that
this is appropriate), or on the line of cases supporting the right
to privacy or the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for refusing
life-sustaining treatment, there is no basis in law to require a
patient to accept pain medication or any other means of allevi-
ating pain or suffering-this would violate the established right
to refuse virtually any treatment. By arguing for a vision of
unfettered autonomy, proponents of legalization effectively elim-
inate the possibility of burdening the physician-patient interac-
tions with anything but the most rudimentary procedures.3 7
Michigan's House Bill No. 4134 provides that: "[tlhe attend-
ing physician and at least one other physician [shall] have
counseled the patient regarding the patient's medical diagnosis
and prognosis, treatment options, and the nature and risks of
the aid-in-dying procedure." 8' There is no mention here of
providing information regarding pain control, comfort care,
hospice or other alternatives to death as a relief. More impor-
135. See Brody, supra note 7, at 1385.
136. See, e.g., Mich. H.B. 4134, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1995); N.Y. S.B. 1683, 218th
Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1995); Wash. S.B. 5596, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1995).
137. See Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Challenges to Bans on 'Assisted Suicide":
The View from Without and Within, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 777 (1994); Robert A.
Sedler, The Constitution and Hastening Inevitable Death, 23 HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Sept. 1993 at 20; see also Kamisar, supra note 71.
138. Mich. H.B. No. 4134, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess., § 4(1)(c)(i) (1995).
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tantly, Michigan does not require either terminal illness or
suffering as a qualifying pre-condition of either PAS or eutha-
nasia. Interestingly, Michigan provides that the patient must be
professionally counseled "regarding both the patient's motiva-
tions for requesting aid-in-dying and alternatives to aid-in-dy-
ing."3 9 However, under this bill, particular motives or lack
thereof cannot be deemed a sufficient reason to preclude the
suicide or euthanasia. In Michigan, the absence of any prereq-
uisites for an individual to qualify for medically assisted suicide
or physician-administered euthanasia and the lack of any dis-
qualifying motives or conditions makes the goal of such counsel-
ing somewhat unclear.
In New York's proposed senate bill, "Death With Dignity,"
neither informed decision nor consent is mentioned.'" The
process is governed by a written directive, similar to the pro-
cess involved in a living will. The statute asserts that a "right
to choose to eliminate pain and suffering," is "hereby estab-
lished" and that the right belongs to "mentally competent, ter-
minally ill adults," and the exercise of the right must be "volun-
tary."14 ' Oddly, the statute says nothing about informed con-
sent, nor does it specify how or by whom "competency" is to be
determined.' Instead, it provides that "administration of aid
in dying [shall occur] when and only when, a qualified patient
determines that the time for physician aid in dying has arrived
and has made an enduring request."' "Enduring request," a
phrase borrowed from the Netherlands,'4 appears to be a
check on both competence and voluntariness. However, it turns
out that enduring means simply more than once.' Presum-
ably, it is not important how short or how long the interval is
between requests, so long as there is more than one request.
Thus, the interval might be as short as fifteen minutes, or as
long as two months.
139. Id. § 4(1)(c)(iii).
140. N.Y. S.B. 1683, 218th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1995).
141. Id. § 4900.
142. Id.
143. Id. § 4905 (emphasis added).
144. See Guidelines for Euthanasia, supra note 36.
145. N.Y. S.B. 1683, 218th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. § 4901(6) (1995).
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New York's "Death With Dignity" bill authorizes both assist-
ed suicide and direct administration of a lethal dose of drugs to
the patient.46 Yet, there is no mention of providing informa-
tion about diagnosis, prognosis, risks, benefits, or alternatives
to death as means of relieving pain and suffering. The bill also
fails to require that any information at all be imparted to the
patient prior to the physician administering aid-in-dying. In-
deed, there appears to be no requirement that a physician dis-
cuss anything in particular with the patient. However, some
personal discussions are contemplated to have taken place in
the context of the physician taking reasonable steps to make
sure that killing the patient is "in accord with the desires of
the patient."'47 Washington's Senate Bill 5596 also makes no
mention of an informed decision or consent, although there is
"an evaluation of the patient's mental competence.""
In other words, legislation itself cannot enhance the quality
of an informed consent process that depends on the individual
skills of the physician, that varies from situation to situation,
that involves idiosyncracies of patients, and that takes place in
private. Legislation can require that informed consent be an
element of the decision, that it be voluntary, and even that
some other procedural steps should be required. However, the
procedural steps for consent and information sharing specified
in PAS legislation do nothing to cure the inherent indetermina-
cy of capacity and voluntariness.
146. Id. § 4901(2). "Aid in dying shall mean a medical procedure which will termi-
nate the life of a qualified patient in a painless, humane and dignified manner
whether administered by a physician upon the direction of the patient or provided by
a physician to the patient for self administration." Id.
147. Id. at § 4911. Directive compliance refers to the following:
[pirior to administering aid in dying to a qualified patient, the attending
physician shall take reasonable steps to determine that the directive has
been signed and witnessed, and all steps are in accord with the desires
of the patient, as expressed in the directive and in their personal discus-
sions. Absent knowledge to the contrary, a physician or other health care
provider may presume the directive complies with this article and is val-
id.
Id.
148. Wash. S.B. 5596, 55th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. § 5(4) (1995).
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B. Mental Competence or Decisionmaking Capacity
Competence is a legal determination, rather than a clinical or
medical one. In most states, criteria for adjudicating compe-
tence to determine the need for guardianship have been found
so lacking in specificity and consistency as to be in violation of
due process.5 ' Guardianship statutes in many states are un-
der review and a number have been drastically overhauled for,
among other reasons, a lack of specificity regarding what is
meant by competence. Some experts have identified five differ-
ent approaches to determine competency to consent to treat-
ment, and these range from the mere indication of a choice to
the demonstration of actual understanding. 5' Legal definitions
of competence and capacity have not significantly improved over
the years, and clinical determinations are often informal and
based on imprecise and unspecified factors. The literature re-
flects the view that there is little, if any, agreement in law or
in medicine "about how decisional capacity and its absence are
recognized and determined, what kinds of decisionmaking skills
are necessary for decisional capacity, and what skill levels are
sufficient." 5'
In revised guardianship procedures, the recommended ap-
proach to determinations of incompetency requires an exhaus-
tive assessment of the individual's functional status. 5' The
assessment includes detailed examinations of the potential ward
over the course of several interviews and requests for the per-
149. See In re Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372, 1381 (Wash. 1984) (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
150. See Harriet Haile Shivers, Guardianship Laws: Reform Efforts in Virginia, 26
U. RICH. L. REv. 325, 331 (1992) (citing D.W. Page, Guardians of the Elderly: An
Ailing System, ROANOKE TIMEs AND WORLD NEWS, Oct. 6, 1989, at B1, B2.). A 1987
Associated Press report reviewed guardianship law across the country and identified
areas in need of reform. The report was compiled by 57 reporters who reviewed 2200
probate court files from every state and identified "an unclear standard for determi-
nation of incapacity" as one of five serious shortcomings in the guardianship system.
Id. The Associated Press report prompted congressional hearings and ultimately
guardianship reform efforts in many states.
151. Loren Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 279 (1977).
152. NANCY M.P. KING, MAKING SENSE OF ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 55 (1991).
153. Penelope A. Hommel et al., Trends in Guardianship Reform: Implications for
the Medical and Legal Professions, 18 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 213, 218 (1990).
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formance of a variety of tasks.' When feasible, the assess-
ment is conducted in the individual's own environment.'55
This process is vastly more complex and time consuming than
the process contemplated for decisions regarding PAS.
No such caution or thoroughness is evident in the process
accorded patients who seek the liberty to kill themselves. Mich-
igan, for example, allows a psychologist or psychiatrist to certify
the patient's competence without necessarily having seen the
patient; no specific personal examination is required. 55 If the
attending physician finds that the patient is still competent, of
sound mind and conscious three days later, he or she may be
euthanized' 57
Neither clinical medicine nor jurisprudence can entirely elimi-
nate the inherent subjectivity of assessing someone to be of
sound mind, a phrase which is used interchangeably with ca-
pacity in some proposed legislation. Moreover, it is commonly
believed that "ordinary 'soundness of mind' is something that
everyone is capable of evaluating, and most health professionals
are no more nor less expert in ascertaining it than anyone
else." 8 Despite an array of tests and clinical instruments for
evaluating mental status, the fluidity of the concept itself is its
main feature. There is no consensus regarding what is normal
capacity in the conditions surrounding health care decisions.
Such conditions include significant stress and anxiety, pain,
fear, loss of privacy, separation from familiar surroundings and
loved ones, medication and sedation, financial worries, and
strangers providing often unclear and complicated new informa-
tion at irregular intervals. Add to these circumstances a termi-
nal illness and a desire to die, and the evaluation of decisional
capacity becomes so situational as to be fairly resistant to any
statutory regulation or standardization. Clinical determinations
of decisionmaking capacity are notoriously result-oriented and
subjective. As one writer explained, "a competent patient is one
whose treatment decisions are considered valid and to be hon-
154. Id. at 218.
155. Id.
156. Mich. S.B. No. 4134 § 4(1)(c)(iii),(d)-(e) (1995).
157. Id.
158. KING, supra note 152, at 81.
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ored by caregivers."" 9 A refusal of treatment often triggers an
evaluation of a patient's mental status, whereas consent to the
same treatment would not. If the decision to commit suicide is
considered valid as a matter of law, the physician's interpreta-
tions of decisionmaking capacity will inevitably be influenced by
that shift in the normative perspective; expressions of a wish to
die will not raise concerns about a patient's mental status as
they once might have.16°
A general rule of thumb which has sometimes been asserted
is that the level of capacity required should be related to the
gravity of the decision to be made. Because decisional capacity
is task specific, the more complex the decision and the more
risk involved in potential error, the greater the level of capacity
that might be required.16" ' In other words, consent for an arte-
riogram or brain surgery should require more alertness and
clarity of mind than a decision to take an aspirin. Therefore, it
is fair to ask the question: how much is required for a decision
to be killed?
It can be argued, however, that many ordinary decisions in
life have grave or irreversible consequences and significant risk
of one kind or another, and that efforts to prescribe how much
ability is needed to make any particular decision would deny
some people the possibility of exercising their rights."2 More-
over, any test of the patient's reasoning process would undoubt-
edly be considered burdensome and discriminatory, since such
tests are not required for decisions to withdraw life-sustaining
159. Id. at 55.
160. See Hendin, supra note 18, at 123. According to psychiatrist Herbert Hendin,
easy accessibility to help with suicide will make suicidal patients more difficult to
treat. Id. at 164. In addition to the widely reported difficulty that most physicians
have in recognizing the symptoms of depression, Hendin warns that the complex
interactions between suicidal patients and their treating physicians will become even
more complex with the introduction of legalized PAS/euthanasia:
Even patients who desire an early death during a terminal illness are
usually suffering from a depression that is treatable; they are likely to
be different from those who seek to avoid pain in the last days of termi-
nal illness . . . [t]hose who need to bring suicide and death into the
relationship with their physicians and use it coercively may be expressing
a more severe depression than their doctors may recognize.
Id. at 164.
161. See KING, supra note 152, at 62 n.10.
162. See id. at 63 n.10.
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treatment. Such tests also risk bias in favor of a decisionmak-
ing process that resembles that of the evaluator.
Thus, the determination of decisionmaking capacity in this
context is inevitably a matter of individual case-by-case evalua-
tion that will vary from physician to physician and patient to
patient. The only patients who seem to be clearly excluded from
most of the pending legislation would be those who are uncon-
scious. Variable capacity, limited capacity, fluctuating capacity,
diminished capacity, and even depression and some forms of
mental illness are not presently grounds for the automatic
invalidation of a patient's consent to or refusal of treatment,
but are left to the discretionary judgment of the treating
physicians."
A close look at the statutory treatment of decisionmaking
capacity illustrates the difficulty of relying on it as a safeguard
or a limitation on PAS. Oregon's statute and its progeny in
other states define "capable" by first defining "incapable" as
"lack[ing] the ability to make and communicate health care
decisions to health care providers, including communication
through persons familiar with the patient's manner of commu-
nication if those persons are available. Capable means not inca-
pable."'
The Oregon model also requires mandatory psychiatric or
psychological evaluation only if the treating physician or the
consulting physician believes there is reason to question the
patient's state of mind.'65 Referral for consultation is not for
the purpose of ruling out depression, but only to rule out im-
paired judgment as a result of depression or some other psycho-
logical condition.'66 Again, in the context of official approval
for suicidal ideation and a wish to be dead, what constitutes
impaired judgment? Implicit is the belief that such ideation and
desires for death are sound, rational, and unimpaired. In this
context, to speak of impartial or objective evaluation of such
states of mind makes no sense; it depends on the consultant's
own views of what constitutes impaired judgment. To believe
163. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp 1342 (D. Mass. 1979).
164. Or. Laws ch. 1 (I.M. 16) § 1.01(6) (1995).
165. Id. §§ 3.01(4), 3.03.
166. Id. § 3.03.
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that the continuum along which such determinations are made
will not be influenced by legalization seems short-sighted. Is it
even possible that legalization can avoid either the subjectivity
of individual value judgments or the subtle but pervasive influ-
ence of officially changing societal norms? If anything, legaliza-
tion of previously prohibited behavior for a profession whose
ethics and societal trust are founded on that prohibition would
seem to enhance both the power of the physician's value judg-
ments and the influence of normative changes regarding the
rationality of suicidal ideation in the context of terminal illness.
Michigan's proposed legislation authorizes euthanasia (which
it calls aid-in-dying) for patients who are "conscious, of sound
mind, and mentally competent to consent to aid-in-dying at the
time aid-in-dying is provided." 7 It is the only bill examined
which explicitly requires competence at the time the patient is
euthanized or drugs are prescribed, as opposed to the time the
request is made orally or in writing. According to Michigan's
proposal, the requisite level of mental functioning must have
been certified by a psychologist or psychiatrist, but there are no
limiting criteria, such as terminal illness or suffering or a limit-
ed life expectancy, for eligibility.'68 In other words, any compe-
tent adult is eligible for euthanasia on request in Michigan.
169
The bill does not specify any criteria or standards for measur-
ing how much competence is enough. Is this more or less com-
petence than one would need to consent to an x-ray?
Moreover, since being suicidal is not grounds to invalidate
consent, even a morbidly and treatably depressed patient could
be euthanized or assisted in suicide without any attempt to
treat the depression, or even diagnose it, even in the absence of
any other morbidity, injury, disease, or illness, whether curable
or incurable. Merely being tired of living would be enough in
Michigan. Presumably, women who experience suicidal ideation
in the throes of PMS would also qualify. There is no need for a
slippery slope in Michigan; it would appear they have started
at the bottom of the hill.
167. Mich. H.B. 4134, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 4(1)(e) (1995).
168. Id. § 4(c)(2).
169. Id. § 3(1). A patient 18 years of age or older who is of sound mind and men-
tally competent to consent to aid-in-dying may execute a directive to authorize aid-in-
dying. Id.
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New York's bill refers repeatedly to a "mentally competent
adult," but the bill does not define competence or offer any
specific process for evaluating it.' Since adults are, by law,
presumed competent unless formally adjudicated incompetent,
this safeguard would appear to leave the door wide open to
varying interpretations of a patient's decisionmaking capacity.
There is, indeed, no reference to decisionmaking capacity at all.
The standard is no standard, as no one is specifically responsi-
ble for evaluating or certifying the patient's competence. A
written directive may be prepared in advance and witnessed by
two strangers who do not attest to the patient's mental status,
competence or soundness of mind.' Psychiatric consultation
is discretionary, optional, and subject to the consent of the pa-
tient.' 2 As a result, the New York approach seems rather
loose on the question of the patient's state of mind and deci-
sionmaking capacity both at the time of making the request
and at the time PAS or euthanasia is administered. Thus, if
the patient is depressed to the point of impaired judgment,
however that is determined, he or she could simply refuse a
psychiatric consultation and that would be the end of that. Giv-
en that one characteristic of depression is a denial of the condi-
tion, how effective is an optional referral for a depressed pa-
tient?
Washington's bill includes no definition of competence and no
reference to decisionmaking capacity at all. 3 The legislature
simply finds that physician aid-in-dying "must be a completely
voluntary act" for both the physician and the patient, and that
a competent terminally ill adult has the right to make the
170. N.Y. H.B. 6333, 218th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1995).
171. Id. § 4902. Witnessed directive refers to the following:
a mentally competent adult may at any time voluntarily execute a revo-
cable directive governing the administration of aid in dying. The directive
shall be signed by the declarant and witnessed by two adults who at the
time of witnessing shall meet the following requirements ... 1. are not
related . . . 2. are not entitled to any portion of the estate . . . 3. have
no creditor's claim against the declarant . . . 4. are not the attending
physician.
Id.
172. Id. § 4910. An attending physician who is requested to provide aid in dying
may request a psychiatric or psychological consultation with the consent of the quali-
fied patient, if such physician has any concern about the patient's competence. Id.
173. Wash. S.B. 5596, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1995).
40 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:001
request voluntarily.7 4 Two physicians are required to evaluate
the patient's mental competence, 75 but the criteria for compe-
tence are nowhere specified.
Wisconsin's bill defines incapacity as "the inability to receive
and evaluate information effectively or to communicate deci-
sions to such an extent that the individual lacks the capacity to
manage his or her health care decisions.'76 This definition ap-
pears to be workable, until one reads that the only people
clearly not considered to be of sound mind are those who are
undergoing a formal competency hearing in court for purposes
of appointing a guardian.'77 Thus, health care decisional ca-
pacity in this context is equated with the broader, and general-
ly lower, standard of legal competence unless adjudicated other-
wise by a court of law.
To summarize the difficulties with relying on decisional ca-
pacity or competence as a safeguard provided by the process of
legalization, we offer an observation by an expert on the issue
of competence and decisional capacity in the context of advance
directives: 'Competence' is a value-laden label that only pre-
tends to scientific objectivity and attempts to deny the recipro-
cal relationships between patients and physicians, tests and
standards, individuals and societies."78 We would agree. This
observation suggests that competence and capacity are ultimate-
ly in the eyes of the care provider and are subject to the shift-
ing sands of societal norms and values as much as individual
values. At best, these concepts provide a minimal threshold
standard, below which the patient's choice would be reasonably
denied because the patient is clearly not capable of making the
decision. At most, the statutes can only exhort the physician to
ascertain some evidence of appreciation of the information pro-
vided, the nature of the decision, and the nature of its conse-
quences. In the end, it is a professional judgment call, a profes-
sional judgment about a legal criterion which the physician has
no particular expertise in ascertaining. To say that this consti-
174. Id.
175. Id. § 5.
176. Wis. S.B. 90, 92nd Leg. Reg. Sess. § 156.01(7) (1995).
177. Id. § 156.03.
178. KING, supra note 152, at 60-61.
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tutes a safeguard on the practice of PAS would seem to be
stretching the point.
Those who work with terminally ill patients and care for
them on a day-to-day basis know that such patients are often
experiencing extraordinary stress and anxiety which can distort
judgment. Whether or not terminally ill patients receive pain
medication, which can also distort thinking and judgment, it is
a seriously flawed notion that the clarity and soundness of
mind of many terminally ill patients are not significantly affect-
ed by the illness itself. Moreover, terminal illnesses of their
patients may significantly affect the judgment of physicians as
well.
17 9
C. Voluntariness
This concept turns out to be even more vacuous and mallea-
ble than competence or capacity. Among the bills discussed
above, six states provide that at least two witnesses must attest
to the fact that the patient is "acting voluntarily" in requesting
physician-assisted suicide. 8 ' California requires the attending
physician to attest that the patient is "acting voluntarily," 8'
while Michigan requires certification from a psychologist or
psychiatrist that the patient is "acting voluntarily."'82 Wash-
ington asserts boldly that the legislature "finds" that such an
act as PAS "must be a completely voluntary act,"" and New
York's drafters simply "find" a right to "voluntarily" execute a
written PAS directive.'" However, not one of the bills exam-
ined actually defines the term "voluntary" anywhere. In the
context of PAS and euthanasia, involuntary euthanasia general-
ly refers to the practice of euthanizing competent patients
against their will or without a request to do so;" "nonvolun-
179. Hendin, supra note 18, at 164-65.
180. Colo. R-B. 1308, 60th Leg., 1995 Reg. Sess. § 15-18.8-1302(2)(a) (1995); Me.
H.P. 552, 117th Leg., 1995 Reg. Sess. § 5-903(b) (1995); Mass. H.B. 3173 179th Leg.,
1995 Reg. Sess. § 2(1) (1995); N.H. H.B. 339, 1995 Reg. Sess. § 137-K.4.1. (1995)
Death with Dignity Act, ch. 3, 1995 Or. Laws 2.02(1); Vt. H.B. 335, 1995 B. Sess. §
528(b) (1995).
181. Cal. A.B. 1080, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. § 7196.8(c) (1995).
182. Mich. H.B. 4134, 88th Leg., 1995 Reg. Sess. § 4(c)(ii) (1995).
183. Wash. S.B. 5596, 54th Leg., 1995 Reg. Sess. § 2 (1995).
184. N.Y. S.B. 5024, 218th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. § 4902 (1995).
185. P. Singer & M. Siegler, Euthanasia-A Critique, 332 N. ENG. J. MED. 1881,
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tary" euthanasia is the euthanizing of incompetent patients or
those who are unable to express their wishes.18 Given the
evidence discussed earlier that nonvoluntary euthanasia is
occurring in the Netherlands with some frequency,'87 the pro-
ponents of legalizing PAS and/or euthanasia in the United
States presumably hope to allay fears of such occurrences here.
The fact that the Dutch guidelines require a voluntary request
hardly stops nonvoluntary euthanasia from occurring." We
wonder why such requirements would be any more effective in
the United States. In particular, in the context of cost contain-
ment and the millions of citizens who remain uninsured and
underinsured and risk poverty from lengthy or chronic illness,
voluntariness is an honorable ideal, although difficult to ensure
or guarantee through legislative intent.
The nature of the physician-patient relationship itself mili-
tates against voluntariness and may inherently involve undue
influence even in the best of circumstances. Ironically, one of
the most articulate physician proponents of PAS, Howard
Brody, wrote this of the medical environment and the
physician's power:
If you would think about it, instead of rejecting authority
because it is arrogant and paternalistic, you would see that
patients have a need to recognize authority and bow down
to it. It is not simply that they trust the person in authori-
ty to work miracles for them. It is more basic. To be sick is
to feel dependent and childlike, to feel unwhole, broken,
defective. To be sick is to be robbed of basic self-esteem, to
feel powerless to do what everyone else can do without
hesitation or effort. To be sick is to be embarrassed before
all onlookers. They say that we doctors reduce our sick
patients to dependence and passivity by our arrogance and
authoritarianism. But why should we bother when the sick-
ness has already done it for us?'89
1882 (1990).
186. Brock, supra note 8, at 10. Brock considers both involuntary and nonvoluntary
euthanasia to be "potential unwanted side-effects of permitting voluntary euthanasia."
Id. at 11.
187. See supra part V.
188. See id.
189. HOWARD BRODY, THE HEALER'S POWER 8 (1992); see also NEW YORK STATE
TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 121-22.
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Autonomy is compromised by the fact of illness, hospitaliza-
tion, and all the attendant anxiety and stress of the medical
environment and medical interventions. In particular, terminal
illness would seem to render autonomy and voluntariness more
limited in practice than its idealized vision suggests. This does
not mean that a practice such as PAS or euthanasia should be
nonvoluntary, or that lack of voluntariness is unimportant. On
the contrary, it serves to reaffirm our view that legislative
assertions that the decision must be voluntary neither guaran-
tee voluntariness nor provide any means to assess it in practice
other than by the existence of a recorded request from the
patient.
Each of the bills proposed in the United States provides an
opportunity to revoke the request, but how this would ensure
that the decision was voluntary, rather than ambivalent, is
unclear. Despite provisions prohibiting anyone from subjecting
the patient to undue influence, most of the legislation does not
define this concept. Those statutes that attempt to define undue
influence prohibit persuading the patient that he or she is "a
financial, emotional or other burden to his or her family, other
persons, or the state."'90
The Oregon statute and others modeled on it require a fif-
teen-day waiting period between the patient's initial oral re-
quest and the writing of a lethal prescription, and the statute
requires a combination of two oral requests and one written
request. 9' Presumably this provision is designed to provide a
period of time for reflection and perhaps for a change of heart
on the part of the patient, but it does not cure the problem of a
lack of a definition of, or a standard for evaluating,
voluntariness. If the legislation means only that the decision
should not be coerced or compelled, this would seem a fairly
minimal requirement in a health care setting. Given that coer-
cion is prohibited by all codes of medical ethics and that with
the exception of overuse of chemical and physical restraints in
some settings, coercion requires a court order unless the cir-
190. See Wash. S.B. 5596, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 161(1) (1995); N.Y. S.B. 1683,
218th Reg. Sess. 1st Sess. § 4915 (1995).
191. Or. Laws ch. 3 (I.M. 16) § 3.06 (1995).
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cumstances constitute an emergency, the requirement of
voluntariness hardly seems a particular advantage gained by
legalization.'92
D. Restrictions on Eligibility
Proponents of PAS and euthanasia have always promised
that legislation authorizing the practice would specify narrowly
restrictive eligibility criteria as a central safeguard against
indiscriminate, involuntary, or widespread use of the authori-
ty.'93 This promise is made in order to lessen the fears of
those who raise concerns about the impact of cost containment
pressures on large segments of the poor and disadvantaged, the
elderly and disabled, and those who are already abandoned by,
or under severe economic pressure from, our medical system. As
the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law pointed
out in its 1994 report on physician assisted suicide and eutha-
nasia:
The risk of harm is greatest for the many individuals in
our society whose autonomy and well-being are already
compromised by poverty, lack of access to good medical
care, advanced age, or membership in a stigmatized social
group. The risks of legalizing assisted suicide and euthana-
sia for these individuals, in a health care system and soci-
ety that cannot effectively protect against the impact of in-
adequate resources and ingrained social disadvantages,
would be extraordinary."'
Among the twelve bills we examined, we found that the sup-
posedly limiting criteria turn out to be all but limitless. Partic-
ularly troubling is the most common restriction of PAS to those
with a life expectancy of six months or less due to terminal
illness. There are two components to this criterion: the terminal
character of the condition or illness, and the prognosis of six
192. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 14, at 985-93.
193. Quill et al., supra note 8, at 1383. Quill and colleagues promise that the
practice will be authorized "only after all other alternatives have been exhausted and
failed." Id. at 1381; see also, Miller et al., supra note 4, at 119 (assuring readers that
PAS will be only for those "exceptional" cases where no other measures for relief of
suffering exist).
194. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 120.
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months or less remaining of the patient's life. One searches the
literature in vain for consistency regarding the meaning of
terminal condition or terminal disease. Is terminal illness the
same as the length of time spent receiving terminal care? Is
one terminal when active or aggressive therapy is no longer
considered appropriate? Most of the statutes we examined de-
fine terminal as "incurable and irreversible,"'95 and one state
defines it as simply "incurable" with death expected within one
year.'98 Michigan does not mention terminal illness, or incur-
able and irreversible disease at all in its bill because it does
not restrict PAS to such individuals. 9 ' At what stage, for ex-
ample, is cancer incurable? Is it incurable when it recurs after
remission? After chemotherapy? Is it incurable if there is only a
twenty percent chance of survival after several courses of che-
motherapy and radiation, or must there be no chance of surviv-
al in order to be incurable? Must the patient have tried chemo-
therapy prior to being designated incurable? The bills are not
clear. Moreover, is there empirical or epidemiological data that
suggests physicians are accurately able to predict a life expec-
tancy of six months or one year? Are physicians trained to
predict life expectancy?
Surprisingly, despite increased attention in medical literature
to the management of terminal illness and tremendous expan-
sion of hospice care in the United States, there is little exami-
nation or study of what is meant by terminal illness, or how
long this terminal period of care lasts, and what factors are
associated with or determine the differences in care and their
duration.'98 While there is commonly an association between
use of the word terminal and a limited remaining life expectan-
cy, the association is neither precisely measured nor well re-
searched. The few studies that have been done indicate that the
designation of six months as a terminal period is entirely arbi-
trary and that physicians vary drastically in their interpreta-
tion of what constitutes this terminal phase of illness.'99
195. Those states are California, Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New York, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin.
196. Vt. H.B. 335, 1995 Bi. Sess. 1995 § 5280(11) (1995).
197. Mich. H.B. 4134, 88th Leg., 1995 Reg. Sess. 1995 passim (1995).
198. See Jane McCusker, The Terminal Period of Cancer: Definition and Descriptive
Epidemiology, 37 J. CHRONIC DISEASES 377, 377 (1984).
199. Id.
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One study suggests that physicians' perceptions of arrival at
the terminal phase of illness vary from around eighteen days
remaining to around three months. 00 Another study found
that the average period of time designated as terminal was
around ninety-four days or approximately three months. 0 '
Moreover, extensive evidence exists that physicians' predictions
of expected remaining life are generally inaccurate.2 2 The flat
time-limited frame of reference assigned as an eligibility criteri-
on for these patients ignores the complex and little understood
immunological effects of hope, love, support, and other subjec-
tive factors on disease progression and, consequently, on life
span."' It also risks creating a health care environment in
which patients are discouraged from harnessing their own re-
sources or seeking needed support from others.
It may not be possible to generalize based on the results of
the above studies of terminality beyond the observation that to
offer patients the possibility of being helped to die when the
disease is expected to produce death within six months involves
a far larger population of patients than those customarily con-
sidered appropriate for terminal care in many settings. Thus, it
would not appear to be as limiting a factor as one might sup-
pose. Would legalization of PAS under such criteria result in a
widespread assumption that the final six months of life are to
be avoided by the terminally ill, even if most of these patients
would not consider suicide in the absence of a permissive (legal)
environment for it? What effect will the six-month criterion
have on those who might otherwise seek a measure of healing
200. Christopher Evans & Mark McCarthy, Referral and Survival of Patients Ac-
cepted by a Terminal Care Support Team, 38 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH
310, 313 (1984). In South Camden, England, 125 cancer patients had been referred to
the terminal care support team at widely varying stages in their illness and with
widely varying survival times. Id. Although precise predictions were not made by the
referring physicians, the patients referred by general practitioners had a median sur-
vival time of 18 days, compared with 104 days for patients referred by radiologists.
Id.
201. McCusker, supra note 198, at 383.
202. Robert A- Pearlman, Inaccurate Predictions of Life Expectancy, 148 ARCHIVES
OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 2537 (1988); see also L.H. Heyse-Moore & V.E. Johnson-Bell,
Can Doctors Accurately Predict the Life Expectancies of Patients with Terminal Can-
cer? 1 PALLIATIVE MEDICINE 165 (1987).
203. Barrie R. Casileth et al., Psychosocial Correlates of Survival in Advanced Ma-
lignant Disease?, 312 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1551 (1985).
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or peace of mind in the face of incurable illness? Will it not
risk leaving such patients with a sense that society as a whole
believes there is not much point to the last few months of one's
life, indeed that they are not worth living at all?
With regard to the question of physicians' skills at predicting
life expectancy, the experience of hospice care providers with
prognostication of six months life expectancy is worth noting.
Observers of hospice care practices have long known that such
certification of six months life expectancy for purposes of ob-
taining hospice reimbursement under Medicare is done routine-
ly not because it is accurate, but because the law requires
it.'" Some physicians have suggested that medical profes-
sionals ought to refuse to answer questions about a patient's
prognosis on forms aimed at hospice certification because there
is "no scientific basis on which to answer this question.""5 Is
it not reasonable to expect a transfer of this habit of fitting the
patient's condition into the bureaucratic or statutory require-
ments from hospice care to the practice of PAS and euthanasia?
We see no particular reason to anticipate that the determina-
tion of six months life expectancy will be any more objective or
accurate for the practice of finding eligibility for PAS and eu-
thanasia than it has been for hospice eligibility. In any case, no
particular data base supports the determination that six
months or, as the Vermont legislation suggests, one year, is the
appropriate time frame for PAS."' Again, as does consent and
capacity, life expectancy turns on the physician's judgment, not
on empirical data.
Nor is there any assurance that the six-month time frame
significantly limits the potential universe of patients who may
be considered eligible for PAS or euthanasia. Only one state,
New Hampshire, restricts eligibility for PAS to those who are
experiencing "severe, unrelenting suffering" as well as a "ter-
204. Ronald S. Schonwetter et al., Estimation of Survival Time in Terminal Cancer
Patients: An Impedance to Hospice Admissions?, 6 HOSPICE J. 65, 67 (1990).
205. Howard Brody & Joanne Lynn, The Physician's Responsibility Under the New
Medicare Reimbursement for Hospice Care 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 920 (1984).
206. Vt. H.R. 335, Biennial Sess., § 5280 (11) (1995) (defining terminal condition as
"an incurable condition caused by injury or disease which, regardless of the applica-
tion of lifesaving procedures, would within reasonable medical judgment produce
death within one year.").
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minal condition," but at the same time, it removes the six-
month life expectancy limitation entirely. °7
A terminal condition is defined in New Hampshire's bill as
"an incurable and irreversible condition, for the end stage of
which there is no known treatment which will alter its course
to death, and which, in the opinion of the attending physician
and consulting physician competent in that disease category,
will result in premature death."0 8 What is meant by prema-
ture is anyone's guess. No other time-based criteria are men-
tioned, although this would neither solve the problem of inde-
terminacy nor alter the fact that terminal condition has no
constitutional meaning.2"
Michigan's proposed legislation provides no eligibility restric-
tions whatsoever other than a minimum age of eighteen years:
"A patient 18 years of age or older who is of sound mind and
mentally competent to consent to aid-in-dying may execute a
directive to authorize aid-in-dying."21 Aid-in-dying is defined
as: "the provision to another person of a lethal agent with the
primary purpose of substantially increasing the probability of
the other person's death." ' In other words, Michigan's bill
would authorize physicians to euthanize patients directly pro-
vided that the patient is mentally competent and of sound mind
at the time-and it does not define either. In Michigan, a pa-
tient does not even have to have been under the care of a phy-
sician, for "'patient' means an individual who executes a direc-
tive in accordance with this act."" Thus, there is not even a
pretense that the physician should know anything about the
207. N.H. H.R. 339, Reg. Sess., § 137(K)(3) (1995). This bill provides that
[aln adult who is capable and a resident of New Hampshire, or who is a
patient regularly treated in a New Hampshire health care facility, and
who has been determined by the attending physician and consulting phy-
sician to be in a condition of severe, unrelenting suffering from a termi-
nal disease, and who has voluntarily expressed a wish to die, may make
a written request for medication for the purpose of ending such person's
life in a humane and dignified manner in accordance with this chapter.
Id. The bill was defeated by the N.H. House on January 4, 1996 by 256 to 90.
208. Id. § 137(K)(2)(XIII).
209. Thomas J. Marzen, "Out, Out Brief Candle": Constitutionally Prescribed Sui-
cide for the Terminally Ill, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 799, 814-819 (1994).
210. Mich. H.B. 4134, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3(1) (1995).
211. Id. § 2(9).
212. Id. § 2(g).
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person's baseline level of functioning, range of moods, values,
living situation, or unique ways of communicating. In Michigan,
it is sufficient that the individual has executed a directive re-
questing euthanasia (any reason will do) in order to be consid-
ered an eligible patient."'
Oregon, California, Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, and
Wisconsin propose to limit the choice of PAS to those who have
a "terminal disease," which is defined as "incurable and irre-
versible" and expected to cause death "within six months."214
Vermont requires a "terminal condition," which is defined as
one which is "incurable" and which "regardless of the applica-
tion of lifesaving procedures" will "produce death within one
year."21
5
Washington's "Terminally Ell Patient Act of 1995 ""6 is ex-
tremely difficult to interpret. If the confusion is not intentional,
it is nonetheless difficult to imagine how the provisions could
be any more bewildering than they are. Washington considers a
terminal condition to be one that will result in death "within a
reasonable period of time."" Washington further stipulates
that terminal condition really means one in which "life-sustain-
ing treatment serves only to prolong the process of dying."
21 8
The parameters for PAS are therefore identical to those for the
withdrawal or withholding of life sustaining treatment. The
purpose of withholding or withdrawal is to allow a more natu-
ral dying process, unimpeded by medical interventions. In the
PAS legislation, however, precisely the same conditions are
outlined for medical suicide. The language is confusing in the
extreme. Yet it looks, at first glance, as if the statute is very
213. Mich. H.B. 4134, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2(g) (1995).
214. See generally, Cal. A.B. § 1310 (1995); Col. H.B. 95-1308 (1995); Me. H.P. 552
(1995); Mass. H.B. 3173; Or. Laws ch. 3 (I.M. 116) (1995); Wis. S.B. 90, 92nd Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (1995).
215. Vt. H.R. 335, Bi. Sess. § 5280(11) (1995) (emphasis added).
216. Wash. S.B. 5596, 55th Leg. Reg. Sess. (1995).
217. Id. § 3(8).
218. Id.; see also Marzen, supra note 209 at 817, stating that:
Apart from the essentially artificial distinction between medical attention
and other forms of care necessary to sustain life, it is surely not the case
that those who might advocate an exception to the ban on assisted sui-
cide would find acceptable a rule that one must die within a "relatively
short time" even with treatment to be eligible for prescribed suicide.
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narrowly drawn and that the safeguard might be truly work-
able. In fact, this is far from the case.
First, life-sustaining treatment is not defined; it may include
virtually any medical or surgical treatment without which the
incurable patient would die. Second, the patient must make a
request in writing or by a video recording in advance" and
send or deliver it to his or her primary care physician, who
may be assigned to the patient and thus not acquainted with
the patient at all.220 Third, although the patient's advance re-
quest must be witnessed by two adults, the witnesses do not
attest to the patient's state of mind, soundness of mind, compe-
tence, or decisionmaking capacity at the time the request is
written or recorded.2 21 Although two physicians (the primary
care physician and a consulting physician) must personally
examine the patient, there is no requirement that these evalua-
tions occur in close proximity to the aid-in-dying.
Finally, in Washington, aid-in-dying turns out to be a "pre-
scription for medication" that will, if self-administered by the
patient, "shorten the process of dying."222 Use of the word "if'
creates confusion. Does this mean that the physician and pa-
tient may decide that the physician, rather than the patient,
should administer the lethal dose directly? The bill, as present-
ly worded, does not appear to preclude this option.
The Washington bill is structured in terms of legislative
findings of a constitutionally protected liberty interest. It is
propped up by a finding that aid-in-dying must be "completely
voluntary."223 But careful reading shows that the bill does not
necessarily preclude euthanizing incompetent or semi-competent
patients who may have been competent at some time, perhaps
even at the time of their request (although this does not appear
to be verifiable under the provisions of the bill). Even the sup-
posed limitation of "death within a reasonable period of time" is
so imprecise as to be virtually useless in guiding behavior.2"
219. Wash. S.B. 5596, 55th Leg. Reg. Sess. § 4(3) (1995).
220. Id. § 3(5).
221. Id. § 4(4)(a)-(d).
222. Id. § 3(1).
223. Id. § 2.
224. Id. § 3(8).
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Thus, the safeguard of limited life expectancy turns out to
rest on quicksand. Marzen argues eloquently against the illu-
sion that terminal condition is a basis on which to rest consti-
tutional authority:
[I]ntroduction of a time-based element itself creates new
problems.... On what basis can one claim the Constitution
as authority to make any such distinction? Inherently vague
and arbitrary criteria must necessarily be built into any
definition of "terminal condition" that employs time-based
elements, the fulfillment of which cannot in any case be
predicted with any exactitude... In sum, the linchpin
criterion of an existing "terminal condition" that, it is ar-
gued, should warrant constitutionally sanctioned assisted
suicide turns out to contain its own "slippery slope," span-
ning from life itself to a life that no amount of treatment
can prolong for even a moment. To select one place or the
other as a bright line that renders assisted suicide a crime
on one side and a constitutionally protected right on the
other would simply be capricious.2"
Improvement in the accuracy of such predictions is considered
unlikely. Physicians receive little training in the skill of prog-
nostication, and although their skills might improve from some
such training, verifying levels of accuracy through randomized
clinical trials is highly problematic.226 Predicting life expectan-
cy would remain a guessing game.
Moreover, reliance on statutory construction to provide effec-
tive safeguards on physician practices, such as imparting and
explaining information, assessing and understanding a patient's
state of mind, and validating consent, that are already known
to be seriously flawed in other areas of medicine is only part of
the problem. The perhaps more serious difficulty stems from
the unfounded assumption that physicians, as a rule, under-
stand the numerous state and federal laws that already govern
the day to day care of their patients. For example, tecent stud-
ies of the use of advance directives indicate overwhelming evi-
dence that both written directives and verbal instructions by
225. Marzen, supra note 209, at 817-18.
226. See Ian R. McWhinney, Evaluation of a Palliative Care Service: Problems and
Pitfalls, 309 BRIT. MED. J. 1340 (1994); see also Robert E. Enck, Prognostication of
Survival in Hospice Care, 7 AM. J. OF HOSPICE AND PALLIATIVE CARE 11 (1990).
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patients regarding end-of-life treatment preferences are routine-
ly ignored by physicians." 7 Numerous studies have found
widespread and significant misunderstandings and misinterpre-
tations among physicians regarding state and federal laws gov-
erning the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.2" While
medical schools are devoting substantial time to the teaching of
medical ethics, far less attention is paid to ongoing legal educa-
tion. What assurance exists that physicians will be better
equipped to interpret and comply with statutory or regulatory
guidelines in the practice of PAS or euthanasia?
E. Witnesses
As noted above, one of the arguments proffered by supporters
of legalization is the claim that physicians currently practice as-
sisted suicide and euthanasia in secret and therefore the poten-
tial for abuse is magnified by the lack of witnesses, records,
and monitoring."9 The claim is that legalization would end
this secrecy and provide a means to verify compliance with
safeguards and guidelines, thereby reducing the risk of involun-
tary or nonvoluntary euthanasia or of PAS for persons outside
the statutory limits. Interestingly, in a survey of 1355 physi-
cians in the state of Washington, ninety percent identified as
the most important safeguard against abuse of PAS or euthana-
227. See Mildred Solomon et al., Decisions Near the End of Life: Professional Views
on Life-Sustaining Treatments, 83 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 14, 19 (1993). This study ex-
amined the responses to 123-item questionnaires sent to 1,400 doctors and nurses at
five major hospitals around the country. The results show that 81% of the respon-
dents admitted that they routinely undertreat pain in terminally ill patients, that
they frequently ignore patients' express wishes regarding treatment, and that medical
personnel are often unaware of laws and hospital policies regarding the care of pa-
tients. See also David Orentlicher, The Illusion of Patient Choice in End-of-Life Deci-
sions, 267 JAMA 2101 (1992); SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A Controlled Trial to
Improve Care for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Understand Progno-
ses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments (SUPPORT), 274 JAMA
1591 (1995); Dying Well in the Hospital: The Lessons of SUPPORT, Special Supple-
ment, 25 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov. 1995 at S3-S36.
228. E.g., Alan Meisel, Legal Myths About Terminating Life Support, 151 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 1497 (1991); Delfi Mondragon, U.S. Physicians' Perceptions of Mal-
practice Liability Factors in Aggressive Treatment of Dying Patients, 6 MED. & L. 441
(1987); Marshall B. Kapp & Bernard Lo, Legal Perceptions and Medical Decision Mak-
ing, 64 MILBANK Q. 163, Supp. 2 (1986).
229. See supra part IV.
1996] LEGALIZATION OF PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE 53
sia the requirement that the patient's request be witnessed by
someone who would not benefit from the patient's death.
230
Yet in the bills examined, witnesses will be present only at
the time of writing and/or signing a written directive asking for
physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia.23' They will not be
present for any conversations between the physician and the
patient, during any of the consultations, or during the informed
decisionmaking process. In theory, witnesses are meant to pro-
vide some sort of oversight about the patient's state of mind
and reassurance about the lack of undue influence and other
improprieties. Indeed, witnesses appear to be subjected to more
stringent qualifications in some of the bills than are pa-
tients.3 2 One puzzling feature of the Oregon model is that
while it requires two individuals to witness the signing of a
written request (a pre-printed form for this is conveniently
provided), it specifies that one of the witnesses shall not be a
relative, a beneficiary of the patient's will, or an employee of
the treating health care facility.233 Nothing prevents the sec-
ond witness, however, from being not only a relative but the
primary beneficiary of the patient's life insurance.
Although the patient's attending physician cannot be a wit-
ness under the Oregon model, it seems that the social worker
or psychiatrist could be. The most bizarre and legally suspect
witness provision, however, involves a complete lack of choice
for those who are residents of long term care facilities. For such
patients, one of the witnesses "shall be an individual designated
by the facility."' From a legal standpoint, this requirement
reeks of conflict of interest. How is this provision in any con-
ceivable way consistent with voluntariness and the prohibition
of undue influence?
Washington, New York and Maine forbid either of the two
required witnesses from being relatives or beneficiaries, 23 ' and
230. Jonathan S. Cohen et al., Attitudes Toward Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia
Among Physicians in Washington State. 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 89, 93 (1994).
231. See, e.g., Wash. S.B. 5596, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 4 (1995).
232. See, e.g., Wis. S.B. 90, 92nd Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. § 156.05(2)(a)(1)-(4), (1995);
Wash. S.B. 5596, 55th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. § 4(4)(a)-(d) (1995).
233. Or. Laws ch. 2 (I.M. 16) §§ 2.02(2)(a)-(c), 2.02(3) (1995).
234. Id. § 2.02(4).
235. See Wash. S.B. 5596, 55th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (1995); N.Y. S.B. 1683, 218th
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Washington generously adds that the witnesses also should not
have any creditor's claim against the patient."6 Wisconsin in-
sists on three witnesses-none of whom are permitted to be re-
lated to the patient in any way, entitled to any portion of the
patient's estate, directly financially responsible for the patient's
health care, or to be a health care provider (other than a chap-
lain or a social worker)." 7 On the other hand, Wisconsin stip-
ulates that "[i]f a requester (a patient requesting PAS) is a pa-
tient in a nursing home or community-based residential facility,
at least one of the witnesses to the request shall be a patient's
advocate .... ,238
This raises the same questions we posed earlier with regard
to whether palliative care consultants or committees would not
inevitably be biased in favor of PAS. Why else would they
agree to serve as witnesses? What impact will this have on the
role of patient advocates for the elderly or disabled? How will
the advocacy role be perceived by those who do not wish suicide
and who may actually fear being a victim of non-voluntary or
involuntary euthanasia?
Moreover, Wisconsin provides a written form for the "State-
ment and Signatures of Witnesses" in which the witness as-
serts: "I know the requester personally or I have received proof
of his or her identity and I believe him or her to be of sound
mind and at least 18 years of age.""3 9 This provision does not
appear to preclude a complete stranger from attesting to the
patient's soundness of mind after being assured of his or her
identity by means of a driver's license.
Michigan avoids this problem by not requiring any witnesses
at any time. Under Michigan's House Bill 4134, "[a] directive
shall be in writing, dated, and executed voluntarily. The direc-
tive shall be signed by the patient, or in the patient's presence
at his or her direction. The directive may specify conditions
under which aid-in-dying will be authorized."2"
Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. § 4902.1-4902.4 (1995); Me. H.B. 748 (1995).
236. Wash. S.B. 5596, 55th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. § 4(U)(C) (1995).
237. Wis. S.B. 90, 92nd Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. § 156.05(2)(a)(1)-(4) (1995).
238. Id. § 156.05(4)(4)(b).
239. Id.
240. Mich. H.B. 4134, 88th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. § 3(2) (1995). This stipulation is
reiterated later in the statute by a provision which states that the statute does not
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In other words, the patient decides when and under what
circumstances PAS or euthanasia will be appropriate, further
expanding the state's already vaporous criteria. The only direct
communication from the patient that is required is as follows:
"at least fifteen days before aid-in-dying is provided... [tihe
patient [must have] communicated to the attending physician
the patient's request that the aid-in-dying authorized in the
directive be carried out."24' Such communication, therefore,
might actually take place as long as a year before the admin-
istration of euthanasia. For example, during an office visit, the
patient might deliver his or her directive to the physician with
the instruction--"when I am in a bad state such as I've de-
scribed here, just go ahead and do it." According to the bill, the
patient must actually be "conscious, of sound mind, and mental-
ly competent to consent to aid-in-dying at the time the aid-in-
dying is provided."' If the directive is written well in ad-
vance, is this not an illustration of exactly the case in which
the physician might be sorely tempted to claim that the patient
was conscious and alert when, in fact, he or she was not? Who
would know?
F. Definitions of Abuse
Michigan's proposed statute is wide open in terms of eligibili-
ty, and allows euthanasia as well as PAS. The statute, howev-
er, does attempt to identify what constitutes abuse: nonvolun-
authorize ending the patient's life other than as provided in the statute. Id. § 8.
This act does not authorize a deliberate act or omission to end human
life other than aid-in-dying by a physician when voluntarily requested by
a conscious patient who is of sound mind and mentally competent to
consent to aid-in-dying at the time aid-in-dying is provided in accordance
with this act.
Id. This does not, however, preclude subsequent amendments to expand the scope of
the act to include unconscious patients, nor does it preclude the subterfuge that oc-
curs in the Netherlands when acts that are outside the scope of the guidelines are
not reported or recorded. Id.
241. Id. § 4(a)(iii) § 10(1)(a),(b),(c),(d). Section 10(2) provides that if the patient dies
as a result of coercion or euthanasia without a request, the violation is punishable by
life imprisonment. Id. at § 10(2). However, section 7(1) provides that anyone who
participates in or administers euthanasia or PAS operates with civil and criminal
immunity, and also immunity from any administrative sanctions as long as the direc-
tive is executed in compliance with the statute. Id. § 7(1).
242. Id. § 4(e).
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tary euthanasia, forging or falsifying a directive, coercion, and
concealing or ignoring a revocation of a directive.' But since
there are no witnesses to the writing and signing of the direc-
tive requesting euthanasia, and assisted suicide does not re-
quire any witnesses, and since there are no reporting require-
ments of any kind, where is the oversight or accountability or
monitoring of the process? Where, indeed, are the safeguards?
The entire interaction may involve only the patient, the attend-
ing or treating physician, a psychologist or psychiatrist, and a
professional counselor. The entire transaction and the patient's
euthanasia or suicide may be accomplished privately within
fifteen days after receipt by the attending physician of the un-
witnessed directive.' If relatives hear about it in time, they
may challenge the patient's decision in court.' The directive
remains in the patient's record, but there is no report to any-
one.
Washington declares it unlawful for anyone to persuade the
patient that he or she "is a financial, emotional or other burden
to his or her family, other person, or the state."246 The bill
prohibits forging or concealing a patient's recorded or written
request and/or concealing a revocation.' 7 As will be discussed,
none of these listed abuses must be reported, investigated, or
punished.
G. Reporting Requirements
Reporting abuse would seem to be an essential step in any
meaningful regulation of the practice of PAS or euthanasia.
Identification of what constitutes abuse provides no safeguard if
no mechanism is in place for reporting it or investigating its
occurrence. Astonishingly, neither the Oregon statute nor even
one of the other pending bills examined has any provision for
reporting suspected abuse, observed abuse, or any kind of abuse
of this practice whatsoever.
243. Mich. H.B. 4134, 88th Leg. Reg. Sess. § 10(1)(a)-(d) (1995).
244. Id. § 4(1).
245. Id. § 6(1).
246. Id. § 16(1).
247. Id. § 16(3).
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For example, in an odd display of priorities, the Washington
bill provides for "fair and reasonable" fees for the suicide
service,' and stipulates that "advertising" the service will be
regulated by the state,249 but there is no reporting re-
quirement of any kind. Images of Dr. Jack Kevorkian's obituary
clinics come disturbingly to mind. Despite all the informing and
explaining and reviewing that is supposed to be undertaken by
the primary care physician and the consultant, none of the con-
versations with the patient have to be recorded in the patient's
chart. The "completed and witnessed recorded request" must be
placed in the patient's permanent medical record, but since no
report is required, knowledge of what has transpired is confined
to those who participated, all of whom are given a blanket
immunity based on their good faith belief that their actions
were lawful:
A physician, health care professional, health care facility,
employee of a health care facility, or licensed pharmacist,
who, acting in good-faith compliance with the requirements
of this chapter, participates in, or is present at, aid in dy-
ing at the voluntary recorded request of a qualified patient
is not subject to civil, criminal, or administrative liability
for participating in or being present at the aid in dy-
ing....
No physician, or licensed health care professional acting
under the direction of a physician, who acts in good-faith
compliance with the requirements of this chapter, shall be
liable for professional misconduct or disciplinary action
solely because of his or her participation in aid in dy-
ing.=
If good faith is the standard for immunity from legal liability
or professional discipline, would the record-keeping or reporting
requirements provide the possibility of evidence to dispute a
248. Wash. S.B. 5596, 55th Leg. Sess. Reg. Sess. § 12 (1995). "Fees-Fees set by
physicians or health care facilities for providing aid-in-dying must be fair and reason-
able." Id.
249. Id. § 18(3). Advertising of aid in dying services is subject to regulation by the
state of Washington. Id. The very fact that they are called services worthy of adver-
tising is peculiar in itself.
250. Id. § 14(1)(a),(2).
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physician's or other health care professional's own assertions of
"good-faith compliance"?
Probably the most stringent reporting provision is New
York's:
Hospitals and other health care providers who carry out the
directives of qualified patients shall keep a record of the
number of such directives executed and report annually to
the commissioner the patients' ages, types of illnesses and
the dates the directives were carried out. In all cases, the
identity of the patients shall not be reportedY1
While this seems adequate at first glance, closer examination
shows that no individual or state agency is identified to review
these reports, and oversight of the decisionmaking process is
precluded, as elsewhere, by the privacy and confidentiality of
the physician-patient relationship. While the bill prohibits "in-
ducement," "tampering," "coercion," and "fraud,"252 there are
no means to discover these violations unless they are directly
observed and revealed by the observer. No one is required to
report such observations to anyone; nor is anyone authorized to
investigate any abuse or violations even if they are observed or
suspected. Ironically, one provision asserts that "[N]o physician
shall be required to take any action contrary to reasonable
medical standards in administering aid in dying."25 Given
that these bills, if enacted, will turn centuries of medical ethics
upside down, the presumption that euthanasia and PAS fit
neatly and comfortably within reasonable medical standards
amounts to an extraordinary kind of hubris.
X. How ABUSE OF OTHER VULNERABLE POPULATIONS IS
HANDLED BY THE LAW
It is instructive to compare the statutes aimed at prevention
and control of the abuse of children, spouses, and the elderly
with these proposed statutes aimed at legalization of PAS
and/or euthanasia on the promise that they will somehow limit
251. N.Y. S.B. 1683, 218th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. § 4818 (1995).
252. Id. § 4915.
253. Id. § 4912 (discussing medical standards).
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the risk of abuse.2" In laws aimed at preventing and/or stop-
ping child abuse, spouse abuse and elder abuse, reporting re-
quirements are clearly spelled out in the body of the statutes,
with identification of those professionals required to report,
under what circumstances, what kinds of acts, and to which
state agency. 5  Moreover, state agencies are specifically
identified and authorized to investigate suspected abuse, and
guidelines are provided for the hiring and training of personnel
to accomplish these tasks."6 The assumption is that even
though abuse may not always be preventable, it can at least be
identified and, with appropriate intervention, the goal should be
to see that it stops. In the case of child abuse, certain profes-
sionals are subject to mandatory reporting requirements in all
fifty states, and there are sanctions for failures to report.257 In
some states, a reasonable suspicion of abuse is all that is nec-
essary to trigger the reporting requirement."58 Moreover, im-
munity from liability (for defamation) is provided for the report-
er of the abuse or suspected abuse, not for the accused abus-
er. 9 Mandatory reporting, with civil and criminal penalties
for failure to report, exists in most jurisdictions.26
By contrast, the PAS/euthanasia legislation, as currently
written, provides no specific requirement for any individual,
professional or lay person, to report abuse or suspected abuse of
the practice, nor any statutory penalties of any sort. While
certain forms of abuse are identified in most of the bills
(forging or falsifying directives, coercion and undue influence),
no one is obligated to report them, and no one is identified to
investigate such practices.
Concern to provide blanket immunity from civil and criminal
liability is evident in the proposed legislation. As noted earlier,
254. See Brock, supra note 8, at 14; Miller et al., supra note 4, at 122.
255. E.g., 210 ILCS 30/1 to 30/6 (West 1995 & Supp. 1995). See, e.g., TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 34.01 (Vernon 1982).
256. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-808 (1977); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §
51A (West Supp. 1984-85);
257. Landeros v. Flood, 551 P.2d 389 (Cal. 1976).
258. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8A-3 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.1 (Re-
pl. Vol. 1995).
259. E.g., MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 119, § 51A (Law Co-op. 1994 & Cur. Supp. 1995).
260. Richard L. Granville, Immunity, in LEGAL MEDICINE: LEGAL DYNAMIcS OF
MEDICAL ENCOUNTERS 110, 110-16 (1983).
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Connecticut's very brief bill is aimed exclusively and entirely at
this function alone."6 ' Its stated purpose is "to provide an af-
firmative defense to manslaughter in the second degree for
physician assisted suicide."262 Immunity from liability is not
only a defense for the defendant against whom a civil or
criminal suit has been filed, but it may also prevent discovery
of evidence or investigation of facts. Some states already have
laws that protect certain hospital and peer review committee
records from discovery through immunity provisions.26 There
is no reason to believe that this well-established approach to
protecting the health care professional and the medical records
from public review and/or investigation would be any different
in the case of PAS and euthanasia. If anything, we should
expect an intensification of this protectiveness.
The Oregon statute, in fact, illustrates this.2" The relevant
provisions, which are replicated verbatim by California,26 Col-
orado,266 Maine,26 7  Massachusetts 6. and New
Hampshire269 require documentation in the patient's medical
record of all oral and written requests, all offers to rescind
requests, and all determinations of decisionmaking capacity.27
In addition, the statutes require the physician to note in the
patient's chart that all appropriate and required steps have
been taken pursuant to the statute, and a notation regarding
the medication prescribed to the patient.2 '
Oregon then specifies that the Health Department "shall
annually review a sample of records maintained pursuant to
this Act." 72 A sample? How many is a sample? Ten? Three?
Fifty? What individual or agency is designated to review this
sample? The statute does not say. Nor does it specify any train-
261. See generally supra part IV.
262. Conn. S.B. 334, Reg. Sess. (1995).
263. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-205 (1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 41.675(2)
(1995); N.Y. EDUC. L. § 6527(3) (McKinney Supp. 1990).
264. See Or. Laws Ch. 3 (I.M. 16) (1995).
265. Cal. A.B. 1080 (1995).
266. Colo. H.B. 1308 (1995).
267. Me. H.P. 552 § 5-912 (1995).
268. Mass. H.B. 3173 § 3(I) (1995).
269. N.H. H.B. 339 Ch. 137-K:10(I-VII) (1995).
270. Or. Laws Ch. 3 (I.M. 16) §§ 3.06, 3.09(1) (1995).
271. Id. § 3.09(7).
272. Id. § 3.11.
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ing or investigative authority for the individual who might
review the records. Oregon's "Death with Dignity Act" and the
other bills copied from it authorize local health departments to
"make rules to facilitate the collection of information," but "the
information collected shall not be a public record and may not
be made available for inspection by the public."27 No specific
agency, including the health department, is identified or autho-
rized to receive reports of suspected abuse or to investigate
them.
In summary, Oregon's statute and all of the other bills ap-
pear to provide blanket immunity from civil liability, criminal
prosecution, or professional discipline for anyone who in good
faith participates in, observes, or carries out the administration
or prescription of lethal medication. Coupled with the absence
of meaningful reporting requirements and the ongoing protec-
tion of privacy and confidentiality, legalization of PAS offers no
remedy for secrecy, no safeguard against abuse, and no limita-
tion on the potential universe of eligible patients.
XI. CONCLUSION
Statutes are not written for case-by-case adjudication. They
are crafted in broad, general categories designed for a generic
situation and cannot, by definition, be designed for each indi-
vidual circumstance, much less extraordinary circumstances. At
best, they outline the boundaries of permissible and prohibited
behavior, but they are not capable of capturing the nuances of
complex interactions or providing detailed instructions on specif-
ic behaviors. Given the documented confusion of terminology
and the absence of consistency or consensus from state to state
on definitions (of such concepts as terminal, for example, or
decisional capacity, or even who should be permitted to avail
themselves of medical death), the promise of regulation, stan-
dardization, clarity and openness is unfulfilled. In our view, it
cannot be fulfilled. Any constitutionally based definitions of
these concepts would necessarily preempt conflicting state defi-
nitions, but there is no evidence that a basis exists for the
273. Id.
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Supreme Court to define the terms any more meaningflly.274
Most importantly, in the context of health care, laws are not
intended to substitute for the professional judgment of the phy-
sician. And it is ultimate reliance on physician judgment and
physician disclosure that renders the practice of PAS/euthanasia
essentially unregulatable.
Some PAS proponents, notably Quill275 and Brody,276 ap-
pear to assume for PAS transactions an idealized picture of the
physician-patient relationship as one characterized by relative
equality, intimacy, shared power, and open communication. This
ideal is rarely realized in practice, as both authors surely
know.277 Interestingly, this ideal is in sharp contrast to the
physician-patient relationship envisioned by the legislation
which, by and large, paints a stark picture of a relationship of
strangers, of physicians assigned to patients, and patients who
have never before been under the care of the physician desig-
nated to help them die. Witnesses can be brought in from the
hospital corridors, shown the patient's driver's license and per-
mitted to attest to the patient's soundness of mind. The record
is written by the physician who performs the act in private.
The public is prohibited access to any records. What is other-
wise potentially an experience of overriding intimacy and spiri-
tuality becomes rather bureaucratic, mechanistic, and perfuncto-
ry.
274. See Marzen, supra note 209.
275. See Quill et al., supra notes 8, 17, 26, 116; Quill, supra note 23 and accompa-
nying text.
276. See BRODY, supra note 189; Brody supra notes 7, 116, 135; Brody & Lynn,
supra note 205 and accompanying text.
277. The New York Task Force also warns of the inevitable effects of societal in-
equality on the practice of PAS and euthanasia:
[Ilt must be recognized that assisted suicide and euthanasia will be prac-
ticed through the prism of social inequality and prejudice that character-
izes the delivery of services in all segments of society, including health
care. Those who will be most vulnerable to abuse, error, or indifference
are the poor, minorities, and those who are least educated and least
empowered. This risk does not reflect a judgment that physicians are
more prejudiced or influenced by race and class than the rest of soci-
ety-only that they are not exempt from the prejudices manifest in other
areas of our collective life.
NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 125.
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One wonders how a record of the quantity of cases, or an
annual reporting of statistical information, will provide any
indication of inappropriate or unauthorized euthanasia. The
Dutch have acknowledged that one reason the reported inci-
dence of euthanasia is still so low in the Netherlands is that
when an incompetent patient is euthanized, it is simply not
reported as euthanasia because it was not voluntary.27 How
are the bills now pending in the United States going to pre-
clude either physician-patient collusion, or physician-prosecutor
collusion not to report PAS?
We maintain that it is not within the capacity of any law to
pierce the veil of doctor-patient confidentiality, or to overcome
the complex uncertainties of medical decisionmaking, the in-
herent instability of the concept of terminality, the vagaries of
prognosis and mental status, the subtle emotional interactions
of the dying and the doctor, or the infinity of human suffering.
Would better statutes than those analyzed here correct these
deficiencies? We think not. The belief that a better law could
enact truly protective guidelines which would enable this prac-
tice to live up to the idealized vision of its proponents is to
presume vastly more from medicine and law than either is
capable of delivering. The legalization of PAS appears to rest,
in part, on the unfounded assumption that a statute can enable
physicians dispassionately and scrupulously to distinguish the
appropriate and voluntary suicide wish from the nonvoluntary
and impaired, and that physicians will have no self-interest at
stake in hastening the death of patients whom they cannot
cure, simply because they cannot cure them.
On another level, the proponents of legalization often claim
that statutes will be able to limit the practice to PAS and
maintain the prohibition against euthanasia where the state's
legislators choose to do so, or that either or both practices can
be limited to the conscious and alert patient and will not be
administered to the unconscious or the unwilling. 9 There is
no basis, either in law or in history, for these assumptions. As
amply argued elsewhere, there is no basis under constitutional
law for limiting the practice to PAS-exactly the same individu-
278. See van der Maas et al., supra note 47.
279. See supra note 8.
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al interests and state interests are at issue, and exactly the
same balance would prevail.28 Moreover, the experience of the
Netherlands indicates the fallacy of assuming that guidelines,
whether laid out in statutes or as a matter of social policy, are
effective barriers against unauthorized practices. The entire
foundation, structure and edifice rest solely and exclusively on
the physician's professional discretion and judgment at all stag-
es of the process.
Apparently cognizant of the fact that restrictions and safe-
guards will not work, some proponents appear ready to accept
this and they argue that the resulting deaths would not be too
high a price to pay. Dan Brock, for example, asserts that volun-
tary active euthanasia may well "slip into nonvoluntary eutha-
nasia,"281 but that this would not be too bad because the deci-
sions could be made by surrogates and "would often accurately
reflect what the incompetent person would have wanted."282
Thus, the argument seems to be that nonvoluntary euthanasia
(the killing of patients who are unable to make an explicit re-
quest because incompetent, and who have not made an explicit
request for whatever reason) would only have to accord with
the patient's wishes often-but not always-to be acceptable.
Is legalization, then, really about regulating PAS and eutha-
nasia at all? Or, on the contrary, is it about de-regulating the
physician? As two observers have commented in relation to the
Netherlands, the toleration of euthanasia there has resulted not
in greater patient autonomy, but in physicians having more
power than ever over the life and death of their patients.2"
The fact that the vast majority of physicians are ethical and
well-intentioned is beside the point. The adherence to any pub-
licly approved guidelines or safeguards for containing the prac-
tice of PAS and euthanasia within certain limits, however
flawed such guidelines may be, depends almost exclusively on
the good will and professional judgment of the individual physi-
cian who acts in private. Thus, it is not the patient's request
280. See Kamisar, supra note 71, at 234.
281. Brock, supra note 8, at 20.
282. Id.
283. Keown, supra note 43 at 238-39 (stating opinions of Jos V.M. Welie & Henk
A.M.J. ten Have); see also Hendin, supra note 18, at 163.
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for euthanasia that determines the outcome, but rather the
physician's judgment that such a request is appropriate and
that the patient is not suffering from impaired thinking in
wanting to die. In other words, that the patient's request is
warranted because, in the physician's judgment, the patient's
life is not worth living. As the New York State Task Force
points out:
For all medical treatments, ranging from simple procedures
such as blood tests to surgical procedures and treatments
such as chemotherapy, physicians also decide which pa-
tients are candidates for the treatment. If assisted suicide
and euthanasia were accepted as "therapy," physicians
would make a medical judgment about which patients are
"good" candidates for the practices. Physicians would also do
what is routinely called for in good medical practice-they
would make a recommendation. Even assuming that all
physicians would act in good faith, never attempting to
pressure their patients to commit suicide or to accept eutha-
nasia, physicians' recommendations would be a powerful
factor in their patients' choices. Indeed, patients generally
do what their doctors recommend.'
It has long been noted by physicians and non-physicians
alike that there are intense feelings of ambivalence, defensive-
ness, and even hostility experienced by physicians in the course
of caring for terminally ill patients. No physician, however well
intentioned or seasoned and experienced, is completely "immune
to the fear, anxieties and frustrations engendered by the appar-
ently helpless, hopeless patient."2"5 More recently, Herbert
284. NEw YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 122.
285. Kamisar, supra note 14, at 992. Kamisar quotes at length from numerous
medical sources regarding the effects of pain, terminal illness, and analgesics on men-
tal functioning:
Working with a patient suffering from a malignancy causes special prob-
lems for the physician. First of all, the patient with a malignancy is
most likely to engender anxiety concerning death, even in the doctor.
And at the same time, this type of patient constitutes a serious threat or
frustration to medical ambition. As a result, a doctor may react more
emotionally and less objectively than in any other area of medical prac-
tice.... His deep concern may make him more pessimistic than is nec-
essary. As a result of the feeling of frustration in his wish to help, the
doctor may have moments of annoyance with the patient. He may even
feel almost inclined to want to avoid this type of patient.
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Hendin had this to say about the attitude of doctors and pa-
tients towards terminal illness, "It will not always be possible
to know the 'intent of the heart' or to uncover the intense am-
bivalence that terminal illness and imminent death inflame in
both doctors and patients."286
Legalizing PAS/euthanasia means accepting the failure of
medicine to confront the reality of death and dying and the
powerful emotions it generates within both doctors and pa-
tients. Euthanasia provides both an illusion of control for both;
it brings death within the diagnostic differential and provides
the cure in death itself. Legalizing euthanasia and/or PAS feeds
the quick-fix mentality of our society instead of struggling for
the difficult and slow process of searching for and perhaps re-
defining the proper roles and limits of both medicine and law.
In the end, medicine cannot save any of us. With its imperfect
use of language and its inherently limited reach into the hearts
and motives of fallible human beings, law is likewise incapable
of being both permissive and respectful of privacy, while also
requiring strict accountability and procedural standardization.
The fundamental problem with legalization of PAS and eu-
thanasia lies in the nature of the physician-patient relation-
ship-that it is conducted in private and protected by the ethi-
cal and legal requirements of confidentiality. Therefore, it is
inherently inconsistent with on-site procedural regulation.
There is also the added problem of the relationship of the state
or society to the profession. By definition and by social contract,
a profession enjoys a position of favor in society that is attrib-
utable to several factors. One is the presumption of greater
education or training and expertise on the part of the profes-
sional. Another is the promise of the profession as a whole to
promulgate codes of ethics and to regulate itself according to
those codes. Professional autonomy, the most valued character-
istic of professional groups, is honored by society and by the
state (in its laws) on the basis of the promise of self-regula-
tion.287 Commentators on this issue have pointed out that
Zarling, Psychological Aspects of Pain in Terminal Malignancies, in MANAGEMENT OF
PAIN IN CANCER 213-14 (Schiffrin ed. 1956).
286. Hendin, supra note 18, at 167 (1994); see also Sherry T. Sutton et al., Pain
Management in the Terminally Ill, in HANDBOOK OF CRITICAL CARE PAIN MANAGE-
MENT 481, 493 (Robin J. Hamill & John C. Rowlingson eds., 1994).
287. See Criton A. Constantinides, Professional Ethics Codes in Court: Redefining
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when professional codes (for example, the AMA Code of Ethics
or the codes of the various sub-specialties of medicine) recognize
an explicit commitment to the public trust, the public willingly
accords autonomy to the profession on the promise of self-
regulation.2" The courts have judicially recognized the medical
profession's codes of ethics as the source of the public's trust in
the profession:
[Ilt is important to remember that the ethics of the medical
profession constitute more than just a set of regulations
affecting members of a particular profession; they also grant
the public, specifically a patient seeking a physician's help,
an affirmative right to rely on his physician to faithfully
execute those ethical obligations. 9
Legalization of PAS/euthanasia requires a fundamental and
drastic realignment of all codes of medical ethics since Hippoc-
rates. At the same time, it requires an adjustment on the part
of the public to a new relationship to the medical profession.
No longer would the general prohibition against killing or as-
sisting in suicide, and the commitment to healing, be the linch-
pin of medical integrity. Henceforth, the commitment to healing
would be quite unclear.
To regulate PAS, as well as legalize it, would require aban-
donment of both the privacy of the physician-patient relation-
ship and the confidentiality of medical records and conversa-
tions. To regulate the decisionmaking process leading to physi-
cian-assisted suicide or euthanasia in a meaningful way, that is
to supervise the decisionmaking process for compliance with
statutory provisions on a case by case basis, would subject both
physicians and patients to what we suspect would be an
unacceptable and possibly humiliating intrusion. Declaring PAS
or euthanasia a right or a liberty interest of constitutional
proportions effectively precludes such an extensive burden on
its exercise.
the Social Contract Between the Public and the Professions, 25 GA. L. REV. 1327
(1991).
288. Id. at 1351.
289. Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, 499 N.E.2d 952, 959 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986), cert.
denied, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987).
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We doubt in any event that the medical profession, or the
universe of patients who would ultimately seek PAS or eutha-
nasia, would in the long run endorse such a cumbersome and
bureaucratic-indeed undignified-passage from life if they fully
grasped its implications. The stated goals of those who propose
legalization are compassion, dignity, privacy, and relief from
suffering. We share their concerns, but we also believe it is
impossible to provide this right or liberty interest in the context
of a private relationship and at the same time enable its regu-
lation. It is simply not reasonable to grant such awesome power
to an already powerful profession, and to maintain its profes-
sional autonomy and the public's trust while pretending to
regulate and monitor the practice of physician-assisted suicide
and euthanasia. Even if one does not share our moral resis-
tance to PAS, the problems of devising effective safeguards
against abuse should by themselves be sufficient to cause grave
worries and ultimate rejection of PAS.
The presumption that the law can prevent the abuse of au-
thority is unfounded: laws alone cannot prevent abuse of any
kind. The function of the law is to identify the range of permit-
ted and prohibited behavior and to punish transgressions.
Where the examined bills do address this question directly, as
in Washington's "Terminally Ill Patient Act,"29 they nonethe-
less are crippled in their effect by the nature of the act being
proposed and the privacy of the transactions. When one also
takes into account the absence of any meaningful reporting
requirements or any means of addressing violations of the pro-
posed laws, the assertion that these bills will have any effect
on abuse is simply unsubstantiated.
More importantly, the only purpose that will be achieved by
these laws is to protect physicians and health care facilities
from any liability for their actions in connection with PAS.
Whether the legislation is crafted in excruciating detail and
attempts to address all possible contingencies and even spells
out various acts that are not approved, or whether it is a sim-
ple and straightforward offer to protect physicians, the result
290. Wash. S.B. 5596, 55th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. § 16(5) (1995) ("Nothing in this
chapter may be construed to condone, authorize, or approve the deliberate ending of a
life without a qualified patient's documented and witnessed request.").
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will be the same. The only purpose that can be served, and the
only goal achieved in practice by legislation, will be the de-
regulation of euthanasia and the de-criminalization and legiti-
mization of PAS-in other words, the protection of the physi-
cians and health care facilities. It will not, and cannot, achieve
the goal of protecting patients or of preventing or limiting
abuse. If protection of patients and meaningful regulation of
PAS/euthanasia is the goal, no legislation can achieve it. If
protection of physicians and health care providers who want to
perform PAS is the goal, virtually any simple paragraph such
as Connecticut's bill29' will achieve this purpose.
AFTERWORD
Since the completion of this article in the summer of 1995,
significant developments have occurred in the courts in Oregon
and, of broader significance, in the Ninth Circuit which includes
California, Washington and Oregon. On August 3, 1995, Judge
Michael R. Hogan of the United States District Court in Oregon
handed down his long awaited opinion on the constitutionality
of that state's Death With Dignity Act, 92 ruling it unconstitu-
tional on equal protection grounds.293 Arguing on several lev-
els, Judge Hogan declared, much as we have here, that the
safeguards in Oregon's Death with Dignity Act are drastically
inadequate to protect vulnerable individuals such as the elderly,
the infirm, the disabled, and the mentally unstable from subtle
pressures to commit suicide, and that the difficulties inherent
in assessing depression, competence, voluntariness, and life
expectancy are insurmountable.294 Affirming that all persons
are equally entitled to the state's protection against substan-
dard medical care, Judge Hogan rejected the distinction be-
tween terminally ill patients who seek suicide and other per-
sons who are suicidal, calling it "illusory."295 Such individuals,
he argued, could not be deprived by a majority vote of their
291. See supra note 61.
292. See supra note 58.
293. Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995).
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1433.
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right to equal protection of the state's laws aimed at preventing
suicide.296
Judge Hogan's decision is on appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit also
agreed to rehear its own prior ruling which found Washington's
law prohibiting assisted suicide to be constitutional.297 The
two-to-one panel decision was reheard by a court of eleven judg-
es. The rehearing was granted in response to arguments sub-
mitted by Washington's chapter of "Compassion in Dying" (the
pro-euthanasia society that filed the original lawsuit) that the
decision was biased by the Catholic background of one of the
judges. That decision, in March 1995, had reversed the ruling
by the Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court in Seattle, Barba-
ra Rothstein, that Washington's law against assisting suicide
was unconstitutional. Judge Rothstein argued that seeking
physician-assisted suicide was not constitutionally distinguish-
able from exercising the right to forego life sustaining treat-
ment and that, therefore, there is a constitutional right to com-
mit suicide and, by extension, to obtain a physician's help in
doing so.29
The Ninth Circuit panel rejected Judge Rothstein's reasoning
and maintained the constitutional distinction between commit-
ting suicide and refusing life sustaining treatment. This dis-
tinction holds, the court stated, because the right to forego life
sustaining treatment is based on the line of cases establishing
the right to be free of unwanted bodily intrusions and not, as
Judge Rothstein had argued, on the line of cases establishing
the right to abortion.299
Also during 1995, the Colorado legislature tabled its bill on
assisted suicide, although it may still appear on the November
1996 ballot. Washington's version of the bill died in committee
as did bills in Maryland, Virginia, and New Mexico... not ex-
296. Id. at 1431.
297. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, reh'g en banc granted, 62
F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995).
298. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994),
rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995).
299. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 590.
300. New Mexico Senate Bill 446 expanded the definition of 'terminal illness" to
cover painful physical disability and mental illness and would have permitted lethal
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amined here. The New Hampshire House Judiciary Committee
voted in 1995 to put their bill aside while they study the ques-
tion of alternatives to assisted suicide, but in 1996 the New
Hampshire bill was defeated by a vote of 256 to 90 in the New
Hampshire House."0' Thus far, Oregon remains the only state
to legalize physician-assisted suicide.
Although legalization appears to be moving rather slowly in
the state legislatures, the same cannot be said of the courts. A
Michigan jury, ignoring the provision of that state's law against
assisting suicide, acquitted Dr. Jack Kevorkian of criminal
charges for his role in helping two individuals to kill them-
selves.3
02
Even more significantly, on March 6, 1996, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, after re-hearing the case of Compassion in
Dying v. State of Washington, handed down a ruling which, if
upheld, would provide supporters of legalization a strikingly
broad and permissive framework within which to pursue their
goals.0 3 In striking down the Washington law making physi-
cian-assisted suicide a felony, the court said that the law violat-
ed the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of personal liber-
ty.3  The sheer scope of Judge Stephen Reinhardt's decision
and reasoning is breathtaking. One wonders why the court be-
lieves it is necessary to move with such speed on this issue,
particularly in light of evidence that the state's, presumably
representing their constituent's views, are not moving forward
to legalize or constitutionalize PAS. °5 A full discussion of the
Ninth Circuit decision is beyond the scope of this article, but
we will make several observations which, we believe, support
our assertion that legalization represents, at best, a mere fa-
cade of regulation by means of unenforceable guidelines and, at
worst, an opening to state-sanctioned euthanasia.
injections administered by medical as well as non-medical personnel.
301. Nat Hentoff, Dr. Kevorkian and Roe v. Wade, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 1996, at
A17.
302. Jeff Martin et al., Kevorkian Cleared: Jury Finds Doctor Didn't Break Law in
Assisting Two suicides in 1993, DET. FREE PRESS, Mar. 9, 1996, at Al.
303. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 94848 (9th Cir.
Mar. 6, 1996).
304. Id. at *12.
305. Marc Spindelman, Reliance on Public Opinion is Misplaced, LEGAL TIMES,
Mar. 25, 1996, at 23-24.
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Meanwhile, a new proposal has emerged from academia
which purports to strengthen the procedural aspects of Oregon's
statute, correct some of the acknowledged weaknesses in that
statute's regulatory features, and provide a "model" for future
legislation in this area."6 We will discuss this proposal briefly
before addressing the main features of the Ninth Circuit deci-
sion.
A. The Harvard Model
The authors of A Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate
Physician-Assisted Suicide argue that the medical and ethical
basis for physician-assisted suicide is relief of suffering,0 7 and
that the legal basis is the extension of the right to make deci-
sions on life-sustaining treatment.0 8 The existence of the lat-
ter right, they suggest, means that PAS does not signify a
change in medical practice or public policy, but is "a natural
and appropriate extension of presently accepted practices."3"
For reasons already discussed, we disagree.
It is ironic that the authors of the model statute have chosen
to confine their discussion to physician-assisted suicide and
simply to ignore the issue of euthanasia. Framing their discus-
sion in this way enables them to avoid noting that the distinc-
tion between passive and active euthanasia (removing artificial
life support versus injecting lethal medication) is more sustain-
able than the distinction between physician-assisted suicide and
voluntary active euthanasia. We agree with Professor Yale
Kamisar's analysis of the implications of erasing the former
distinction and the impossibility of maintaining the latter dis-
tinction for very long.310 To offer a "model" statute that is
based on failing to deal with this issue is intellectually strange.
The authors of the Harvard model admit that they choose to
avoid addressing the issue of euthanasia out of concern for
306. Charles H. Baron et al., A Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate Phy-
sician-Assisted Suicide, 33 HARv. J. LEGIS. 1 (1996).
307. Id. at 4.
308. Id. at 5.
309. Id.
310. See Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide-Even a Very Limited Form, 72 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 735, 749 (1995); Kamisar, supra note 71.
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public opinion: the public, in their view, would be likely to offer
"greater acceptance" of a statute allowing only PAS because of
the "perception of voluntariness" 31' and because there exist
"strong ethical objections of some physicians and others to eu-
thanasia."M This is hardly a principled reason for avoiding
the issue; it seems the triumph of politics over ethics.
The Harvard model neither avoids nor corrects any of the
regulatory problems we have pointed out in this article. The
inherent impossibility of truly limiting eligibility is acknowl-
edged at the outset. The authors apparently voted on this ques-
tion and the majority "agreed to allow anyone to be eligible
whose illness is incurable and who subjectively feels that the
accompanying suffering is worse than death."313 There is, they
admit, "no objective standard" for such a condition because it is
inherently subjective.314 Far from wanting to restrict the prac-
tice, the drafters acknowledged that "it was not possible to con-
struct an objective definition that was not overly restrictive as
to the patients who would meet it." 315 Since there is no "cure"
for many of the degenerative effects of old age, when is an
elderly person "incurable"? The criteria for eligibility remain as
indeterminate, subjective, and impossible to limit as ever.
If eligibility is wide open, does the model statute contain
viable means of safeguarding the vulnerable elderly or the
abandoned cancer patient? The Harvard model contains the
minimal requirement that requests for medical means of suicide
must be competent, voluntary, informed, and enduring (made at
least twice). 16 We have discussed at length our view that
these are unworkable and unenforceable.
What about procedural requirements? The procedures are
facilitative, not regulatory. They are intended to ensure that
anyone desirous of suicide because of suffering and incurable
illness will be able to do so, and that the physician who helps
achieve this goal will not be subject to legal sanctions. The
311. I& at 10.
312. Id.
313. Id at 11.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 18.
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model statute goes so far as to include a provision explicitly
extending the blanket of legal immunity to anyone who "as-
sist[s] the responsible physician in providing medical means of
suicide to a patient."317 What is meant by "assist"? These pro-
visions are clearly not intended to protect patients or restrict
the practice. They seem intended to facilitate the practice and
protect the providers, apparently acting with or without any
supervision by a physician.
Included in the Harvard model is an interesting provision
about witnesses: two witnesses must be present for the discus-
sion between the physician and patient regarding the request
for medical means of suicide."' 8 The witnesses may also ques-
tion the patient and/or the physician to ascertain the level of
comprehension of the information being provided."9 In addi-
tion, the physician must document this discussion by written,
signed transcript, or by means of audio or video taping. Inter-
estingly, however, of these two witnesses, it is required only
that one of them not be involved in the care of the patient and
not stand to benefit from the patient's death.32 Why not pre-
clude both witnesses from belonging to either of these catego-
ries? As it stands, it would appear that at least one witness
may be either a care provider or stand to profit from the
patient's death. 1 This provision would hardly seem to qualify
as a safeguard.
The model statute would grant wide latitude to state agen-
cies to craft their own rules and regulations for monitoring the
suicide process, and to design the form on which physicians
would supposedly report their compliance with suicide re-
quests.322 The model statute contains no provision urging or
requiring any individual, professional or lay person, to report
suspected violations of the statute. While purporting to offer
317. Id. at 30-32.
318. Id. at 28-29.
319. Id. at 28.
320. Id. at 24.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 22 ('The statute proceeds on the assumption that it is impossible in
such a complex field to deal in advance with all possible problems by a legislative
act. We believe that a reasonable solution is to enact the legislation and then to pro-
vide an administrative body with the power to respond to new patterns of problems
through the regulatory rulemaking process.").
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"strong safeguards and precise procedural requirements,"S
the operating principle of the model statute seems clear from
the following:
Section 3(a) [of the model statute] places the responsibility
on the responsible physician to ensure that all of its re-
quirements are met. In order to provide the physician with
considerable advance assurance that he or she can avoid
litigation attempting to second-guess his or her determina-
tions, the statute makes the physician's standard entirely
subjective: the physician need have only an "honest belief'
that the elements of section 3(a) have been met in the partic-
ular case."2
Thus, according to the Harvard proposal, the best that can be
offered to reassure the public about adequate safeguards is
that, in the event of allegations of malfeasance, the physician
can avoid the scrutiny of public accountability through the legal
system simply by asserting that it was his or her "honest be-
lief' that the procedures had been appropriately followed.
Another example of the facilitative rather than protective
function of the model statute is found in the provisions for
consultation during the suicide decisionmaking process. The
Harvard model appears to contain some regulatory "teeth" in its
requirements for professional consultation prior to PAS. Howev-
er, as one looks more closely at these provisions, they appear
"curiouser and curiouser." Section 5(a) requires the responsible
physician to "secure a written opinion from a consulting physi-
cian .... that the patient is suffering from a terminal illness or
an intractable and unbearable illness."3 = Section 5(b) requires
the physician to "secure a written opinion from a licensed psy-
chiatrist, clinical psychologist, or psychiatric social worker...
to the effect that the request" for suicide is not the result of
distorted judgment or undue influence, and is "reasoned" and
"fully informed."26 Section 5(c) then requires that the above
opinions be placed in the patient's record. 7
323. Id. at 12.
324. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
325. Id. at 29.
326. Id at 29.
327. Id
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Doesn't this provide a system of checks on the accuracy and
appropriateness of the decision? Not at all: the only opinions
required to be obtained and placed in the record are opinions
corroborating the appropriateness of the suicide. There is no
requirement anywhere that any contradictory opinion, any opin-
ion questioning the appropriateness of the request for suicide, be
placed in the record.
Another interesting departure from the Oregon statute occurs
in the provisions regarding reporting of the incidence of PAS.
Although the Oregon statute seems drastically deficient in re-
quiring only that the state Health Department annually review
"a sample of records maintained pursuant to this statute," the
Harvard model requires no annual review of any medical re-
cords by anyone. It requires only that participating physicians
submit a "report" of the process, the content and form of which
is determined by the state health commissioner. 28 The regula-
tory process is therefore open ended and unspecified and is left
to state discretion and, ultimately, the physician's assertion of
good faith.
3 29
What happens in the event of suspected abuse? The Harvard
model does not define abuse. The only person reviewing the
physician's report is the Commissioner of Public Health or some
equivalent state employee. The possibility of the Commissioner
obtaining the medical records of a patient in which the decision
for PAS seemed questionable appears extremely remote: the
Harvard model exempts medical records from public access
under the state's public records statute or freedom of informa-
tion act.33" Anyone requesting a medical record, therefore,
would have to overcome these formidable barriers to access by
providing substantial grounds for suspicion of malfeasance. It is
difficult to imagine that any participating physician would sub-
mit a report containing evidence of unethical or illegal acts.
We are thus offered a model statute in which: (1) the basic
criteria of suffering is acknowledged to be subjective and there-
fore impossible to define or determine by objective standards;
(2) the safeguards are carried out by means of an honor system
328. Id. at 30.
329. Id. at 32.
330. Id. at 33.
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of physician self-regulation; (3) the only professional consulta-
tions required and recorded are those supportive of the request
for PAS; (4) the two individuals who witness the suicide discus-
sion may consist of a beneficiary of the patient's will or an ex-
hausted care provider; and (5) any allegation of malfeasance
can be defeated by the physician's assertion of good faith.
The fact that the drafters of a model statute choose to side-
step the question of euthanasia entirely speaks volumes: if it
were intended that the practice be limited to PAS, then surely
the drafters of model legislation would want to demonstrate
how that can be achieved in order to reassure the public. Since
they fail to demonstrate any such limitations, we conclude that
this is not their goal and that the omission serves as implicit
acknowledgement of the impossibility of limiting the practice to
PAS. We reiterate what so many have pointed out previously-
that merely to assert the possibility of limiting this practice
either to the terminally ill or only to the final stages of termi-
nal illness,3"' or limiting it to physician-assisted suicide on-
ly3 2-- is simply not good enough. Such assertions remain ex-
actly that: assertions-unproven, unsubstantiated, ungrounded
assertions, lacking evidence of workability in the real world of
clinical medicine and in present day society. As discussed be-
low, the courts also make these assertions of limitability with-
out attempting in any way to demonstrate their validity.
B. The Ninth Circuit Decision
The 1996 Ninth Circuit ruling is an eight-to-three decision af-
firming the original District Court decision striking down Wash-
ington state's law prohibiting assisted suicide3" and over-
turning the 1995 appellate decision by a three-judge panel of
the Ninth Circuit which had concluded that there is no due
process liberty interest in physician-assisted suicide.3"
331. See Robert A. Sedler, Are Absolute Bans on Assisted Suicide Constitutional? I
Say No, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 725 (1995).
332. See Timothy E. Quill et al., Sounding Board: Care of the Hopelessly Ill-Pro-
posed Clinical Criteria for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1380
(1992).
333. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F.Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
334. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995).
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Judge Stephen Reinhardt, writing for the majority, found a
constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide for the termi-
nally ill, based on "the compelling similarities between right-to-
die cases and abortion cases." 35 Apart from the fact that both
decisions involve death, and both decisions are therefore laden
with intense moral significance, we believe there is precious
little similarity between them. On the contrary, it is the differ-
ences which should draw attention. One obvious and relevant
distinction, among many, is that abortion has an inherently
self-limiting quality: it will never be undergone by anyone out-
side the universe of pregnant women. The two qualifying attrib-
utes of gender and pregnancy are objectively verifiable. Preg-
nancy is not a matter of opinion or perception, but is a condi-
tion subject to an objective test, the results of which can be
confirmed by repetition.
By contrast, the characteristics that are alleged to define the
parameters of eligibility for PAS have no such objective quali-
ties and are not self-limiting. The problem with concepts like
"terminal," "competent" and "voluntary" is not that they cannot
be defined, but that the definitions are not clinically verifiable
with tests or measurements. Although proponents of legaliza-
tion, including Judge Reinhardt, assure the public repeatedly
that the practice can be regulated by means of these estab-
lished and definable categories of people (terminally ill, compe-
tent, suffering, and so on), there is no objective, agreed-on stan-
dard in clinical medicine for evaluating these conditions. Since
the movement to establish a right to suicide entails establishing
a clinical procedure that its proponents promise will be "careful-
ly regulated"336 and subjected to "rigorous safeguards,"337 is
it too much to expect that some aspect of the clinical evaluation
be accessible to objective criteria? Regulation of abortion is, on
the basis of clinical criteria, realistic and feasible; the outer
limits are knowable and the physical indicia are observable.
There are no such qualitative or quantitative limits to the de-
cision for PAS.
335. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 94848, at *7
(9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996).
336. Id. at *37.
337. Id.
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Even if one agrees that permissive attitudes towards abortion
may result in more pregnant women choosing that option, the
aim of the individual choosing abortion and society's ostensible
goals are to protect or enhance the quality of the mother's
health or life, either by removing a direct threat to her health
or by enabling her to participate more fully in society. There is
no comparable rationale for PAS; death does not enhance the
well being of the deceased unless non-existence is defined as
enhancement.
It is entirely possible that the availability and acceptability of
PAS will enhance the lives of care givers, family members, even
physicians and nurses, and that it will also enhance the eco-
nomic well being of hospitals and insurers. The Ninth Circuit
seems to acknowledge that patients may well be motivated to
seek suicide because they perceive themselves to be a burden,
and it suggests that the concern to avoid becoming a financial
burden is laudable:
[Wie are reluctant to say that, in a society in which the
costs of protracted health care can be so exorbitant, it is
improper for competent, terminally ill adults to take the
economic welfare of their families and loved ones into con-
sideration.'
By acknowledging and apparently approving of the patient's
perception of illness as burdensome to others, the way is paved
for the medical community and society as a whole to take the
same view. Indeed, Judge Reinhardt briefly addresses and then
dismisses 39 the concerns that have been raised by a number
of commentators, including Yale Kamisar, the New York State
Task Force on Life and the Law,' and John Pickering, Chair
of the ABA Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly,3 4 '
338. Id. at *36.
339. Id.
340. See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 125.
341. See Kamisar, supra note 310, at 737-39; see also John H. Pickering, The Con-
tinuing Debate over Active Euthanasia, BIOETHIcS BULLETIN (ABA), Summer 1994, at
1, 2. Mr. Pickering expressed his opposition to a California ballot initiative to legalize
physician "aid-in-dying," which included both PAS and active voluntary euthanasia:
[The resolution] calls for "voluntary aid in dying... without undue
influence or duress. .. ." The lack of access to or the financial burdens
of health care hardly permit voluntary choice for many. What may be
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regarding the dangers of enacting PAS legislation in a society
where gross inequities exist in health care as a result of dispa-
rate socio-economic conditions. We share the view that
"voluntariness" is an idealized concept which fails to take into
account the profound effects of poverty on all aspects of a
person's life, health status, access to and quality of health care,
as well as manner of death. Rather than seeing these inequities
in our society as a compelling reason to maintain the prohibi-
tion against PAS and euthanasia, Judge Reinhardt takes the
view that the judiciary should "stand aside from that battle." It
is odd, indeed, to stand aside from a struggle to provide access
to decent health care for everyone in our society, regardless of
income or health status, and yet to lead the charge, as it were,
toward unlimited access to means of death.
In rendering its opinion, the Ninth Circuit avoids resolving a
number of crucial concerns regarding the feasibility of regula-
tion by simply redefining terms and declaring certain previously
valued moral distinctions of no importance. First to disappear is
the use of the word "terminal" in any consistent manner that
enables it to be a useful criterion. The court dismisses this
difficulty at the outset with a curious argument. The court
points out that, at present, at least forty states have enacted
living will statutes that define "terminal illness" in widely vary-
ing and inconsistent ways. However, instead of viewing this as
evidence of the malleability and permeability of the concept, the
court views this definitional smorgasbord as evidence that "ter-
minal" can, indeed, be defined, and so it is simply not a prob-
lem. 2 As we have pointed out, the issue is not whether the
word can be defined, but whether the definition has any basis
in clinical reality such that it makes sense to define a class of
people in this manner, not only in order to exercise a constitu-
tional right, but also to undergo a medical procedure resulting
in death.
voluntary in Beverly Hills is not likely to be voluntary in Watts.
342. Compassion in Dying, No. 94-35534, at *32 ("While defining the term 'termi-
nally ill' is not free from difficulty, the experience of the states has proved that the
class of the terminally ill is neither indefinable nor undefined. Indeed, all of the
persons described in the various statutes would appear to fall within an appropriate
definition of the term.").
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Even more troubling, however, is the court's attempt to elimi-
nate the terms "suicide" and "euthanasia" from the discussion.
In addressing the state's interest in preventing suicide, Judge
Reinhardt writes:
We are doubtful that deaths resulting from terminally ill
patients taking medication prescribed by their doctors
should be classified as "suicide" . . . [because] deaths that
result from patients' decisions to terminate life support
systems or to refuse life-sustaining food and water, for
example, are not.3"
Thus, the court reasons, "we have serious doubt that the state's
interest in preventing suicide is even implicated in this
case.""' This seems an extraordinary line of reasoning.
Later, in its discussion of the dissent's arguments and con-
cerns about potential abuse, the court tries to dismiss concerns
about the inevitable extension of PAS to euthanasia by, again,
redefining the terms. Euthanasia, the court insists, is only
euthanasia when it is done involuntarily.345 The Ninth Circuit
cites no reference for this definition: "the act or practice of
painlessly putting to death persons suffering from incurable and
distressing disease, as an act of mercy, but not at the person's
request."' Interestingly, Black's Law Dictionary defines eu-
thanasia in exactly the same words, but makes no distinction at
all between the involuntariness or voluntariness of the act.347
Most commentators have customarily used the term "non-vol-
untary euthanasia" when the patient is incompetent, "involun-
tary euthanasia" when it is done over the patient's protest, and
"voluntary euthanasia" when the patient requests it. 3" Now
the Ninth Circuit declares that because the Washington statute
at issue in Compassion in Dying is concerned with requested
death, "the issue of euthanasia is not implicated here."49
343. Id. at *26.
344. Id.
345. Id. at *62 n.120.
346. Id. (emphasis in the original).
347. BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 497 (5th ed. 1979) ("The act or practice of painlessly
putting to death persons suffering from incurable and distressing disease as an act of
mercy.").
348. See supra notes 185-186.
349. Compassion in Dying, No. 94-35534, at *62 n.120.
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Finally, the court opens the door to surrogate decisionmaking
in this highly complex and complicated arena by focusing all its
moral and legal attention on the issue of voluntariness:
[W]e view the critical line in right-to-die cases as the one
between the voluntary and involuntary termination of an
individual's life.... We consider it less important who
administers the medication than who determines whether
the terminally ill person's life shall end.35
Having effectively eliminated all lines of distinction and de-
marcation between refusing and removing unwanted medical
treatment on the one hand, and providing the means to suicide
on the other, the court finds no significant distinction between
PAS and euthanasia; what matters is simply that it be "volun-
tary."35 1 The Ninth Circuit has extraordinary confidence in the
feasibility of regulation, the insignificant impact of poverty on
health care and medical choices, and the quality of medical
decisionmaking by patients and surrogates in this country's
hospitals. The question of "voluntariness" is the central issue
for the Ninth Circuit, and active euthanasia would be permissi-
ble by proxy because "a decision of a duly appointed surrogate
decisionmaker is for all legal purposes the decision of the pa-
tient himself."" 2 With all due respect, the decisions of surro-
gates are usually legally valid only if they accord with the
patient's known or ascertainable instructions. A full discussion
of this issue is beyond the scope of this article, but raises even
more forcefully the importance of addressing the regulatory
schemes in light of clinical experience in this area of medical
decisionmaking.
The Ninth Circuit decision thus eviscerates the state's inter-
est in preventing suicide or euthanasia by redefining both
terms, and by eliminating every line of demarcation heretofore
recognized in law and ethics along the continuum from refusing
artificial means of life support to injecting a patient with a
lethal dose of medicine. The court bypasses all concerns about
the difficulty, if not impossibility, of providing clear or enforce-
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able limits on the practice by declaring blandly that "while
there is always room for error in any human endeavor, we
believe that sufficient protections can and will be developed by
the various states."3  Where? Which state has done so? In its
153-page opinion, not once does the Ninth Circuit attempt to
show how this might be accomplished. As we have discussed,
we believe that even the Harvard model fails to demonstrate
that this can be done.
In conclusion, we reiterate our contention that regulation of
the practice of physician-assisted suicide is inherently impossi-
ble. We have shown that the intellectual and philosophical
arguments of PAS proponents that are based on promises of
limiting the practice-both in terms of numbers of eligible pa-
tients and in restricting the practice to physicians-assisted
suicide-are contradicted by the statutes thus far proposed.
The Ninth Circuit has declared that, in its view, the Four-
teenth Amendment's liberty provisions include a right to assist-
ed suicide. The Supreme Court will soon, no doubt, be faced
with whether: (a) to uphold this assertion of a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in obtaining medical assistance to
hasten one's death, such that the states may not prohibit PAS,
or (b) to reject the view that the Fourteenth Amendment in-
cludes such an interest and therefore the states may permit or
prohibit selective legalization of PAS as they choose. It remains
to be seen whether individual state laws permitting PAS and/or
euthanasia will be able to pass constitutional muster even if
they result in what appears to us to be very dangerous public
policy.
353. Id- at *34.

